



2

DTIC

ELECTE

FEB 25 1993

S

C

D



LIC INSTABILITY INDICATORS STUDY

ARMY-AIR FORCE CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

JUNE 1992

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

93-04073



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No J704 0188
Exp Date Jun 30 1986

1a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3 DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT This paper has been cleared for Public Release by Security and Policy Review Authorities		
2b DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION		
6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict		6b OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) A-AF CLIC	7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
6c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 85 Birch Avenue, Langley AFB VA 23665-2197			9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Low Intensity Conflict Instability Indicators Study					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Amelia C. Nutt, LTC; David B. Collins, Capt, USAF; Willie L. Moise, Capt, USAF					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Final		13b TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO NA		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1992 June	
				15 PAGE COUNT 113	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17 COSATI CODES			18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The continued erosion of a direct or indirect Soviet threat has ushered in an era of change and the possibilities for a new world order. Tensions resulting from the environment of general instability that we call LIC are occurring daily throughout the world. These events highlight a host of destabilizing factors characterizing a restive world, all of which present an array of unprecedented threats and challenges to the military Services and diplomatic problem resolutions. In order to more effectively operate within the LIC environment, the LIC Instability Indicators Study is an unclassified tool to assist analysts and planners in the development of intelligence assessments and operational planning to address generic threats to US security interests within the LIC arena.					
20 DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL AMELIA C. NUTT, LTC, USA <i>Amelia C. Nutt</i>			22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (804) 764-2630		22c OFFICE SYMBOL A-AF CLIC

DISCLAIMER

This paper represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, the Department of the Army, or the Department of the Air Force. The paper has been cleared for public release by security and policy review authorities.

THE ARMY-AIR FORCE CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

The mission of the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (A-AF CLIC) is to improve the Army and Air Force posture for engaging in low intensity conflict (LIC), elevate awareness throughout the Army and Air Force of the role of the military instrument of national power in low intensity conflict, including the capabilities needed to realize that role, and provide an infrastructure for eventual transition to a joint and, perhaps, interagency activity.

PREVIOUS CLIC PAPERS

CLIC PAPERS are sponsored by the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict. They are dedicated to the advancement of the art and science of the application of the military instrument of national power in the low intensity conflict environment. All military members and civilian Defense Department employees are invited to contribute original, unclassified manuscripts for publication as CLIC PAPERS. Topics can include any aspect of military involvement in low intensity conflict to include history, doctrine, strategy, or operations. Interested authors should submit double-spaced typed manuscripts along with a brief, one-page abstract to the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley AFB, VA 23665-5556.

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification _____	
By _____	
Distribution / _____	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

PREVIOUS CLIC PAPERS

Previous CLIC PAPERS are available in most major military libraries. Copies can be obtained from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), Defense Logistics Agency, Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22304-6145, telephone (202) 274-6434 or Digital Switched Network (DSN) 284-6434 or through your local DTIC account representative. Copies can also be obtained from the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), US Army Logistics Management College, Ft Lee, VA 23803-6043, telephone (804) 734-4255 or DSN 687-4255. These papers together with their DTIC and DLSIE reference number are listed below.

<u>DTIC AD#</u>	<u>DLSIE LD#</u>	<u>SHORT TITLE</u>
A185 972	073892A	Operational Considerations in LIC
A185 973	073893A	Logistical Considerations in LIC
A185 974	073894A	Security Assistance and LIC
A185 975	073896A	The Role of Reserve Forces in LIC
A185 976	073895A	LIC References and Bibliography, Vol I
A185 977	073897A	Army Medical Department Roles and Functions
A185 978	073899A	Operational Art in LIC
A186 280	073898A	LIC Imperatives for Success
A193 702	077085A	LIC Logistic Support Air Force Perspective
A193 703		Competitive Strategies Development in LIC
A193 704	077084A	US Armed Forces Public Affairs Roles in LIC
A193 705	077086A	LIC Education and Training Within the DoD
A193 706		Planning PCO Combat Employment of Air Power
A198 670		Potential for Increased Terrorism Lethality
A198 668		Democratic States Facing Revolutions
A198 669		Technology Guidelines in LIC
A199 026		Understanding Latin Americans
A203 707		The Literature of Low-Intensity Conflict
A205 084		LIC References and Bibliography, Vol II
A205 085		US Military Civic Action in Honduras
A205 086	079667A	Psychological Strategies in LIC
A207 890		Arms Transfers and the Third World
A208 614		LIC Policy and Strategy Statements
A209 046		LIC Overview, Definitions, and Policy
A209 047		Peacekeeping TTPs
A209 048		African Coastal Security
A209 049		A Theater Approach to Low Intensity Conflict
A209 050		Reserve Component Support to LIC Strategy
A209 072		Liberation Theology, Two Views
A215 365		Key LIC Speeches, 1984-1989
A226 242		Counterinsurgency in the Philippines
A224 049		The Role of Military Working Dogs in LIC
A229 716		The US and the Politics of Conflict in the Developing World

PREVIOUS CLIC PAPERS (Continued)

A229 717 **LIC Education and Training Within the DOD
Using Counterinsurgency Tactics in the
Domestic "War on Drugs"
An Annotated Bibliography on Military
Involvement in Counterdrug Operations,
1980-1990
The LIC Planner's Guide (LPG)**

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INSTABILITY INDICATORS STUDY

**ARMY-AIR FORCE CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA**

AUTHORS

Lieutenant Colonel Amella C. Nutt, U.S. Army

Captain David B. Collins, U.S. Air Force

Captain Willie L. Moise, U.S. Air Force

SPONSORS

Lieutenant General Ira C. Owens

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

The Pentagon

Washington, D.C.

Major General Richard J. O'Lear

Headquarters, Department of the Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

The Pentagon

Washington, D.C.

PREFACE

For several years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken to develop policies and programs to address the security challenges presented by the low intensity conflict (LIC) environment. To assist in filling this void, the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, with sponsorship by the HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and HQ USAF Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, developed this study of LIC instability indicators. The LIC Instability Indicators (LICI²) Study is intended to focus analysis and planning on conditions of instability existing across the entire LIC operational continuum. We envision this product will be used by DOD and Service staffs as well as operational organizations in the LIC planning and analysis process. The study's primary objective is to provide a tool to assist military planners, analysts, and operators at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in the execution of the full range of military operations in LIC, and to ensure mission force protection. In addition to its operational value, the LICI² Study has broad application in training and education related to LIC.

Throughout the development of this product, interim drafts of the study were staffed with subject matter experts (SMEs) from the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps at all levels. The culmination of this coordination effort was a week-long workshop in which key SMEs participated. Their critique provided valuable contributions which were incorporated into this final product. The quality of the product is a direct result of their input, which we sincerely appreciate.

In addition to the study's approval by the two Service sponsors, it was briefed to the Military Intelligence Board (MIB), which concurred with the recommendation to pursue Joint publication of this product. Furthermore, a working group is investigating the potential for future automation of the product which we believe will significantly enhance its utility.

One note of caution: As currently presented, this study is unclassified and cleared for public release. However, once real-world data is incorporated, the appropriate classifications must be applied.

Once again, thanks to the many people who contributed to this project. Their assistance was critical to our endeavor, and we appreciate their efforts.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND	CHAPTER II
HOW TO	CHAPTER III
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC	CHAPTER IV
ANTITERRORISM	CHAPTER V
COUNTERTERRORISM	CHAPTER VI
SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY	CHAPTER VII
SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY	CHAPTER VIII
PEACEKEEPING	CHAPTER IX
MASTER INSTABILITY INDICATORS LIST/MATRIX	CHAPTER X
DEFINITIONS/EXPLANATION OF TERMS	ANNEX A
BIBLIOGRAPHY	ANNEX B
BLANK MATRIX	ANNEX C

Chapter I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past several years the Department of Defense (DOD) has worked to develop and implement programs in support of national policies related to security challenges generated by the global low intensity conflict (LIC) environment. This product, the LIC Instability Indicators (LICI²) Study, under the sponsorship of HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) and HQ USAF Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACS/I), was conceived, designed, and developed to address that effort. The LICI² product is unique in that it provides a single source tool for the evaluation/assessment of LIC instability indicators across the full LIC operational continuum. This broad spectrum approach coupled with a high degree of application flexibility permits substantive use at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels by a diverse audience (e.g., analysts, operators, planners, etc.). In addition, the product has a high degree of training and educational value within each of these areas.

The LICI² Study consists of two major portions. Chapters one through three are a basic orientation to the study while chapters four through ten contain substantive content and application. Use of this product involves two or more of its five basic building blocks. These include:

- o Generic Instability Categories (GIC), (e.g., economic, political, etc.)
- o LIC Operational Categories (LOC), (e.g., support to insurgency, peacekeeping, etc.)
- o Types of LIC Operations, (e.g., advisory training assistance, supervision of cease-fires, etc.)
- o Master Instability Indicators List
- o Master Matrix

Individual application of each indicator is identified in the master matrix by the use of:

- o A black box
- o A marker (dot)
- o A blank box

The completed Master Matrix contained in chapter ten gives a graphic depiction of what indicators probably would apply, may apply, or probably would not apply under each type of LOC operation. Individuals using this product for evaluation of real-world data would begin by using a blank matrix and applying the appropriate symbology against the Master Instability Indicators List. The completed matrix would then be a major

tool in the development of a finished "snapshot" assessment. Compiling a series of such "snapshots" could then be used to perform a trend analysis.

Chapter II

BACKGROUND

The Low Intensity Conflict Instability Indicators (LICI²) Study was an internally generated initiative by the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (A-AF CLIC). Due to its anticipated broad use, we requested, and received, sponsorship from both the Army and Air Force Intelligence Service Chiefs (Army DCSINT and Air Force ACS/I).

We initiated this study to fill a recognized void in our ability to successfully operate throughout the LIC military operational continuum. Since the A-AF CLIC serves as the focal point for Army, Air Force, and Joint matters related to military operations in low intensity conflict (LIC) and civil-military (CM) activities related thereto, the conceptualization and development of this study appropriately resided with the Center.

Several factors contributed to the decision to conduct this study: First, the continued erosion of a direct or indirect Soviet threat has ushered in an era of change and the possibilities for a new world order. Second, tensions resulting from the environment of general instability that we call LIC are occurring daily throughout the world. These events highlight a host of destabilizing factors characterizing a restive world, all of which present an array of unprecedented threats and challenges to the military Services and diplomatic problem resolutions. Third, and in direct response to the points above, there was not an unclassified tool to assist analysts and planners in the development of intelligence assessments and in operational planning to address generic threats to U.S. security interests within the LIC arena.

While the LICI² Study has application at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, it is envisioned to have particular value to the combatant commander. It will help focus operational analysis and planning considerations in assessing threats to mission execution and force protection. The LICI² Study focuses analysis on conditions of instability within all the LIC operational categories (contingency operations in LIC, antiterrorism, counterterrorism, support to insurgency, counterinsurgency, and peacekeeping), where the combatant commander will operate.

The LICI² Study is not meant to be a predictive tool to forecast the likelihood of possible U.S. involvement in a LIC mission, or to be a stand-alone tool to give answers. Instead, the study uses an "inside looking in" approach. When used correctly, the tool will highlight the potential threats within the LIC environment by serving as a guide for the analyst or planner to consider basic as well as unconventional instability factors.

Additionally, the study forces the combatant commander, planner, and analyst to ask questions from a variety of sources: information, resources, population, organization, operations, economic, and political.

We coordinated the instability indicators with a wide audience within the Department of Defense. Their expertise provided insight and direction for product utility as well as the construction of the indicators.

Overall, the LICI² Study provides a generic, unclassified, and useful tool which can be applied across the LIC operational spectrum at all levels for both the planner and analyst. The product is a mechanism by which data can be analyzed to assist in the development of area intelligence estimates, threat assessments, and planning requirements.

CHAPTER III

HOW TO

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a common conceptual foundation regarding the structure, content, usage, and potential substantive applications of this product.

To accomplish this, the chapter is divided into two sections. The first is a general purpose orientation on the format of the study--in brief, what each chapter is about--and should serve as a basic road map to using the product. This portion of the chapter should prove useful to persons not familiar with the LICI² Study. The second portion of the chapter is designed for the more advanced user. This section will present a more detailed layout of the study's mechanisms/methodology and will offer several practical, step-by-step, examples of the LICI² Study application.

Basic Orientation. The LICI² Study is designed for use primarily as a threat assessment tool in support of U.S. military forces operating in a LIC environment. However, the generic nature of its construction permits wide flexibility in its application. As a result, specifics regarding the "how to" will vary with user requirements.

Regardless of your application requirement, it is important to be familiar with the overall structure and content of the study in order to achieve maximum value from its use. With this in mind, we will now take a brief look at the various substantive chapters contained in this study.

Chapter one consists of an executive summary, which presents a concise overview of the LICI² Study, its purpose and applications.

Chapter two is the "Background" chapter. It contains the history of the study, to include such aspects as concept development, coordination, research, etc. This chapter should prove especially useful to anyone interested in pursuing either a similar study or building upon this one.

Chapter three is the "How To" chapter. It is divided into two major sections. The first provides a basic overview regarding major components of the study, while the second portion addresses the "nuts and bolts" of applying the LICI² Study methodology to a wide variety of LIC environment problem sets.

Chapters four through nine provide basic information on each of the LIC operational categories (Chapter four - Contingency Operations in LIC; Chapter five - Antiterrorism; Chapter six - Counterterrorism; Chapter seven - Support to Insurgency;

Chapter eight - Support to Counterinsurgency; Chapter nine - Peacekeeping). The text of each of these "support" chapters is structured to address the following key points:

- o Definition/description of what the LIC operational category (LOC) is;
- o In general terms how it operates; and
- o Descriptions of the types of operations conducted by U.S. military forces within that LOC.

Chapter ten consists of two distinct sections. The first is the Master Instability Indicators List, consisting of those potential threat indicators assessed against the Master Matrix. Each indicator has a unique identity number which provides its physical positioning on the Master Matrix. The second section contains the Master Matrix. This section graphically depicts, by generic instability category, LIC operational category, and type of military operation, which indicators contained in the Master Instability Indicators List indicate potential threats to U.S. military operations within a given LIC situation. The matrix depicts the following:

1. **BLACK:** The indicator probably would not be found or apply to that particular type LIC operation.
2. **BLANK:** The indicator may/may not be found or apply/not apply to that particular type LIC operation. The blanks are situation dependent.
3. **MARKER:** The indicator probably will be found and/or apply to that particular type LIC operation.
4. **"X":** The indicator would apply for that appropriate generic instability category (GIC).

In addition to the above chapters, the study contains support annexes:

- o Annex A (Definitions/Explanation of Terms) consists of the study's specialized dictionary. To assist in developing a common understanding of terminology and to assist with user application, any term not listed in a standard dictionary or otherwise thought to require an explanation of how we are using it is defined in Annex A.
- o Annex B contains a bibliography of those documents/publications which contributed substantively to the LIC² Study.
- o Annex C includes a blank matrix set.

Advanced Orientation. Once the user has gained a basic understanding of the study, it is time to discover specific ways in which it can be of value. How the product is used will depend in large part upon individual mission requirements--or, if you will, what your approach vector is. Regardless of this vector, the basic building block options provided by this study remain constant. These include:

- o GICs
- o LOCs
- o Types of LIC Operations
- o Master Instability Indicators List
- o Master Matrix

Your "use" vector will determine how many of these building blocks are used as well as their relationships. To assist in understanding this principle, the following examples are provided:

1. An individual charged with tactical LOC specific analysis (e.g., dealing only with contingency operations or support to counterinsurgency, etc.) would most likely be working with building blocks 2-5 (LOCs . . . Master Matrix) above. In general, real-world data would be compared with the appropriate LOC section of the Master Matrix. "Hits" on the matrix would be recorded on a matrix worksheet. [Note: Numerous hits on indicators not normally associated with your LOC will provide insight into the status of your overall LIC environment and may provide crucial indications of developing problem areas (e.g., deterioration of internal stability which could lead to a noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) requirement)]. The results of this worksheet are then processed by the user, using appropriate mechanisms or organic assets to render a finished situation assessment.

2. An individual charged with trend/estimative analysis would compile several completed matrix worksheets and compare/contrast them for such things as cyclical occurrence of significant indicators, increasing levels of seriousness in occurring indicators, etc.

3. An individual charged with developing a LIC orientation/training program might use the Master Matrix and Master Instability Indicators List in their generic form as an instructional tool for student/newly assigned personnel. Its use as a single source instructional aid for U.S. military operations throughout the LIC operational continuum should significantly reduce an individual's learning curve requirement in this area.

4. A military planner/programmer looking at this product from a requirements/resources perspective might be interested in borrowing a page from example two above and looking at a historical analysis to see if combat-related indicators occur in such a manner that would structure how U.S. resources are applied against the problem (e.g., seasonal offensives due to wet/dry cycles).

Chapter IV

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a common conceptual foundation with regard to contingency operations in LIC to assist in the use of the LIC² Study through a wide range of user applications.

For our purposes, we have taken the definition of "contingency" from Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, and paraphrased to define contingency operations as, "Emergency actions caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or required military operations."

Currently, there is a new statutory definition which is more restrictive (it may not necessarily include, for example disaster relief or security assistance surges) than the one provided in this document. It will likely generate a change in Joint terminology to ensure that doctrine accurately mirrors legislative authority.

Additionally, based on our recent coordination with the Joint Staff, Support to DOD Counterdrug Operations, which is currently under the LIC operational category (LOC) "Contingency Operations in LIC," will likely become a separate LOC, "Counterdrug Operations." In either case, whether retained under "Contingency Operations in LIC" or elevated as a separate LOC, the information in this document remains valid.

Contingency operations by U.S. forces may take place throughout the operational continuum--during peacetime, in times of conflict, or during war. They are most prevalent, however, in the low intensity conflict (LIC) environment.

Contingency operations are often required when diplomatic initiatives are unable to achieve time-sensitive, high-value objectives or when unexpected threats require a rapid and decisive response. Should an adversary reject diplomatic efforts, the immediate use of military forces may be required to defend U.S. interests, rescue U.S. citizens, or protect U.S. assets. Although time-sensitive and of short duration, contingency operations can involve a wide range of traditional military tasks such as air/airborne/amphibious assault, air strikes, airlift, convoy operations, or naval quarantine. Regardless, such operations are usually handled at the highest levels of government and are often Joint or interagency supported operations. The National Command Authority (NCA) usually will determine the criteria for U.S. military involvement in contingency activities during operations short of conventional war.

Military commanders must therefore clearly understand the political objectives and considerations and how they may limit their military operations prior to deploying or employing forces in a LIC operational area. Because contingency operations are conducted in crisis avoidance/management, they are likely to have a strong psychological impact on the attitudes and behavior of the domestic and foreign populace which must be considered throughout both mission planning and execution.

Military forces involved in LIC contingency missions operate under a variety of constraints. Thus the need for operational security and deception will be paramount for operations involving opposing forces. Such considerations will influence not only training and mission specific preparations, but the overall concept of contingency operations as well. While contingency operations can be conducted by forces of a single Service or by forces from two or more Services simultaneously executing separate missions, they are most likely conducted as Joint operations in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, and Joint Test Pub 5-00.2, Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning, Guidance, and Procedures.

Because of the politico-military nature of LIC contingency operations, there is a tendency to create a complex command structure to accommodate each agency's demand. Although simplicity in establishing C³ systems is desirable, complex coordination may be required to achieve operational effectiveness. Regardless of complexity, C³ systems in contingency operations must provide the means to command and control forces, convey intelligence, and coordinate logistics, and interoperability among the forces they support. These systems must be as survivable as the forces they support.

Contingency operations can exploit hostile force vulnerability and target audiences whose support is crucial through various psychological and civil affairs operations. Regional, cultural, professional, and governmental expertise can facilitate proper relationships among the U.S. military, U.S. Government agencies, and U.S. military and host nation officials. However, coordination must be effected at the appropriate level with the U.S. agencies and departments responsible for the other elements of national power (political, economic, and informational) before, during, and after the operation. Because LIC contingency operations involving forces in a combat role are normally more restricted in nature, coordination with other U.S. agencies is essential to achieve the synergy required to achieve maximum mission impact.

To accomplish their mission according to Joint Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, U.S. contingency operations in LIC responsibilities occur in one or more of the following types of military operations:

Disaster Relief. Disaster relief operations provide emergency relief to victims of natural or man-made disasters. They may include refugee assistance, food programs, medical treatment and care, forensic identification, damage control, or other civilian welfare programs. When properly managed, U.S. military participation in disaster relief should have significant positive effects. The military can provide the logistics support to move supplies to remote areas, extract or evacuate victims, provide emergency communications, conduct direct medical support operations, provide emergency repairs to vital facilities, and provide manpower for civil relief and the maintenance of law and order pending reestablishment of control by indigenous police forces. Military elements involved in disaster relief operations are often responsible for the following:

- Supporting the assistance program developed by the Department of State's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

- Assessment of damage, the extent of the disaster, and the internal capabilities of the host nation to deal with the emergency.

Shows of Force. Shows of force lend credibility to the nation's promises and commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate resolve. These operations can influence other governments or politico-military organizations to respect U.S. interests and international law. They can take the form of aircraft and ship visits, combined training exercises, forward deployment of military forces, and introduction or buildup of military forces in a region. The appearance of a credible military force can underscore national policy interests and commitment, improve host nation military readiness and morale, and provide an insight into U.S. values.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) remove threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign (host) nation. The methods and timing will be significantly influenced by diplomatic and psychosocial considerations. They normally affect U.S. citizens, but they may also include selective evacuation of host nation and third-country nationals. Under ideal circumstances, there will be little or no opposition to an evacuation; however, commanders must anticipate and plan for possible hostilities. This type of operation involves swift insertion of a force and possible temporary occupation of an objective followed by a rapid withdrawal. To present the smallest threat to the host nation, NEO forces penetrating foreign territory should be kept to the minimum required for self-defense and for extraction and protection of evacuees. Such operations are conducted under the direction of the Department of State. The U.S. Ambassador or Chief of the Diplomatic Mission is responsible for the preparation of Emergency Action Plans that address the evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign

country by military means. The conduct of military operations to assist in the implementation of Emergency Action Plans is the sole responsibility of the supporting military commander. The following activities associated with NEO provide a common framework for embassy-military dialogue and evacuation planning and operations:

- o Notification and movement to assembly areas
- o Documentation of evacuees
- o Assembly area operations
- o Evacuation site operations
- o Embassy security and operations
- o Medical support required
- o Host nation support

Recovery. Recovery operations are sophisticated activities requiring detailed preplanning in order to execute them precisely, especially when conducted in denied areas. When conducted by the military, they may be clandestine, low visibility, or overt. They may include the recovery of U.S. or friendly foreign nationals, and the location, identification, and recovery of sensitive equipment or items critical to U.S. national security. The execution of recovery operations may be opposed by hostile forces.

Attacks and Raids. Successful attacks or raids can create situations that permit seizing and maintaining the political initiative. Attacks and raids can also place considerable pressure on governments and groups supporting terrorism. The U.S. executes attacks and raids to achieve specific objectives other than gaining or holding terrain. Attacks by conventional ground, air, naval, or special operations forces, acting independently or in concert, are used to damage or destroy high-value targets or to demonstrate U.S. capability and resolve to achieve a favorable result. Raids are usually small-scale operations involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, temporarily seize an objective, or destroy a target(s), followed by a rapid, preplanned withdrawal. These operations may be conducted against targets outside of hostile territory or airspace if a lesser threat to the hostile nation's sovereignty is desired.

Freedom of Navigation and Protection of Shipping. Because the majority of the world's commerce moves by sea, interdiction of shipping can greatly impact U.S. and allied interests. Freedom of navigation and shipping are sovereign rights based in international law. Unrestricted interdiction of shipping on the high seas would normally create a state of war beyond the scope of LIC; however, shipping may encounter a variety of threats in a LIC environment that will not cross the threshold into war.

- Protection of shipping includes coastal sea control, harbor defense, port security, and countermine operations in

addition to operations on the high seas. It requires the sensors, and weapons, as well as a command structure both ashore and afloat that can direct the employment of forces and provide for the logistic structure to support protection of shipping.

- Protection of shipping is accomplished by a combination of operations. Area operations may be either land-based or sea-based and are conducted remote from the sea lanes. They are designed to prevent a hostile force from obtaining a tactical position from which they can attack friendly or neutral shipping. This includes ocean surveillance systems that provide data for threat location and strike operations against offending bases or facilities. Threats not neutralized by area operations, which are sometimes not politically permissible, must be deterred or destroyed by escort operations. Generally, escorts are associated with convoys, although individual ships or a temporary grouping of ships may be escorted for a specific purpose. Countermining operations are integral to successful protection of shipping and are an essential element of escort operations.

- As in all categories of LIC, every effort, particularly diplomatic, should be taken to obtain allied and friendly nation participation in freedom of navigation and protection of shipping operations. When the political situation permits, establishment of a combined command or coordinating committee by a host nation greatly enhances the contribution of U.S. forces. Where the political climate is less benign, protection operations can be coordinated by a series of informal contacts, with forces operating under national auspices. This multiplies the tactical effectiveness of all forces operating in freedom of navigation and protection of shipping missions.

Operations to Restore Order. As the name implies, operations to restore order are intended to halt violence and reinstitute more normal civil activities. Where applicable, they seek to encourage the resumption of political and diplomatic dialogue. They are typically undertaken at the request of appropriate national authorities in a foreign state or to protect U.S. citizens; however, it is unlikely that the consent of all the belligerents will be obtained. They may be conducted in cooperation with other countries or unilaterally. Unlike peacekeeping operations, a force tasked with restoring order is not a disinterested or neutral party. Operations to restore order could suddenly deteriorate into combat; therefore, the participating combatant command should make the appropriate contingency plans for force protection, evacuation, or combat operations as appropriate. It should be kept in mind, however, that the interests of the country or countries that provide forces for these operations are best served by a cessation of violence and a negotiated settlement.

Security Assistance Surges. The U.S. may accelerate security assistance when a friendly or allied nation faces an

imminent military threat. In such an acceleration, support is frequently and initially focused on providing additional combat systems (weapons and equipment) or supplies, but may include the full range of assistance to include financial and training support. Airlift and sealift requirements are dictated by host nation operational needs, geography, magnitude of the logistics effort, and time limitations.

DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations. DOD support to counterdrug operations complies with the national drug control strategy, complements the efforts of law enforcement agencies, and supports cooperative foreign governments. At the level of national strategy, the NCAs have placed increasing importance on the role of the DOD in controlling the flow of drugs across U.S. borders. At the operational and tactical levels, the activities of those who traffic in illicit drugs pose a hostile challenge that clearly places the military, and those they support, in a state of conflict.

- By statute, Congress has assigned to the DOD three counterdrug missions: to act as the lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime drug smuggling into the U.S. in support of the counterdrug activities of Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies; to integrate into an effective anti-drug communications network all the command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the U.S. Government dedicated to drug interdiction; and to approve and fund each state governor's anti-drug plan for enhanced use of the National Guard (in State status) in support of drug interdiction and enforcement operations of drug law enforcement agencies.

Military forces may be involved in a variety of actions taken to detect, disrupt, interdict, and destroy illicit drugs and the infrastructure (personnel, materiel, and distribution systems) of illicit drug trafficking entities. Such actions will always be in support of one or more governmental agencies such as the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Border Patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, or the Drug Enforcement Administration. Military support to counterdrug operations can include mobile training teams, offshore training, advisory personnel, logistics support (materiel, maintenance, resupply, and transportation), civic action, informational, detection and reconnaissance operations, or intelligence support.

- The objective of military counterdrug efforts is to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. Military support is therefore a balanced effort to attack the flow of illegal drugs at each phase of the supply cycle: at the source, while the illegal drugs are in-transit, and during distribution in the U.S.

- Although military support to U.S. counterdrug activities is specifically identified in this chapter, specific linkages have been

proven to exist between narcotics traffickers, insurgents, and even terrorists. Accordingly, military counterdrug operations and activities may also be identified in the other LOCs, (e.g., combatting terrorism and support to counterinsurgency).

Support to U.S. Civil Authority. Support to U.S. civil authority includes those activities carried out by military forces in support of Federal and State officials under, and limited by, the Posse Comitatus Act and other laws and regulations. Congress and the courts traditionally view requirements for military support in civilian domestic affairs as situation-specific. They generally restrict military support to situations involving disaster assistance, civil disorder, threats to Federal property, and other emergency situations.

Chapter V

ANTITERRORISM

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a conceptual foundation with regard to antiterrorism to assist in the use of the LICI² Study through a wide range of user applications.

For our purposes, we have taken the definition of antiterrorism from Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, which defines antiterrorism as, "Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorists acts to include limited response and containment by local military forces." Also, as discussed in Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) 3-07.2, antiterrorism is an element of a broader concept called "force protection" which includes "active and passive measures designed to deter and defeat threats directed toward military service members, their families, DOD civilians, plus support facilities and equipment."

To effectively reduce force vulnerability to terrorism, it must be understood that: the U.S. and its interests are vulnerable to terrorist actions as is any government or society worldwide; and the U.S. military faces a continuous threat in all operations from a multitude of terrorists and individuals using terrorist tactics for criminal or personal gain.

It must be recognized that terrorism focuses on the emotional impact of the terrorist act on an audience other than their victim(s). Historically, the most common terrorists acts have been bombing, assassination, kidnaping, hijacking, arson and the destruction of government facilities and utilities. Regardless of the method, to achieve success, terrorists plan their actions to accomplish one or more of the following:

- o Publicity
- o Demonstration of power and strength
- o Acknowledgement of the group's legitimacy
- o Exact revenge
- o Obtain logistical support
- o Force overreaction of the government or adversary to demonstrate their weakness

To meet potential terrorist threats, all the Services have developed integrated and comprehensive antiterrorism programs which stress deterrence of terrorist incidents through preventative measures and education. The basics of such a program include the collection and dissemination of timely threat information, the conduct of individual antiterrorism awareness programs, and a coordinated security plan. Implementation of sound force protection plans and procedures strike a reasonable balance among the following:

- o Threat analysis
- o Installation/unit criticality and vulnerability assessments
- o Creation of a threat assessment based on the threat analysis and friendly vulnerability
- o Operations security
- o Personal security
- o Physical security
- o Crisis management planning
- o Employment of tactical measures to contain or resolve terrorist incidents
- o Continuous training and education of personnel

To accomplish their mission according to Joint Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, U.S. antiterrorism responsibilities occur in one or more of the following types of military operations:

Intelligence. Intelligence is the first line of defense in antiterrorism. Although the nature of terrorist groups often makes them difficult to penetrate, an all-source intelligence program is essential to identify the threat and provide timely threat warnings. This includes evaluation of terrorism capabilities, tactics, and targeting strategy, and the dissemination of this information to all interested and affected agencies and organizations. Coordinated management of intelligence requirements will facilitate antiterrorism measures and preclude intelligence gaps.

Security. The goal of security is to hinder or deny a terrorist access to a potential target. This includes measures taken by a military unit, an activity, or installation to protect both physical resources and personnel against terrorist acts. Fundamental to the effort to protect our forces and activities is an aggressive Operational Security (OPSEC) program.

Chapter VI

COUNTERTERRORISM

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a common conceptual foundation with regard to counterterrorism to assist in the use of the LICI² Study through a wide range of user application.

For our purposes, we have taken the definition of counterterrorism from Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, which defines counterterrorism as "Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism."

The use of military forces in counterterrorism operations demonstrates U.S. resolve to support stated national objectives and may serve to deter future terrorist acts. Successful employment, however, depends on timely and refined intelligence and prompt positioning of forces. Therefore, intelligence personnel are closely integrated at all planning stages of counterterrorism operations. Examples of critical intelligence requirements for counterterrorism operations are:

- o Precise location of terrorist target to preclude collateral damage
- o Composition and disposition of terrorist security forces
- o Location and routes for terrorist reinforcements
- o Target site characteristics
- o Activities of host nation internal security forces
- o Indications and warning of operational force compromise

Counterterrorism missions are high-risk/high-gain operations which can impact on U.S. prestige worldwide if they fail. U.S. counterterrorism operations may be executed by conventional forces, however, such operations are normally conducted by special units capable of mounting swift and effective action. The force type and command and control relations will depend on location, type of incident, degree of force required, and the legal and political restraints imposed. Additionally, rules of engagement (ROE), issued by competent military authority, are essential in the planning and execution of counterterrorism operations. These ROE will set the parameters for counterterrorism operations by delineating the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combatant activities against hostile forces.

To accomplish their mission according to Joint Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, U.S. counterterrorism responsibilities occur in one or more of the following types of military operations:

Intelligence. Intelligence is the first line of defense in combatting terrorism. Although the nature of terrorist groups often make them difficult to penetrate, an all-source intelligence program is essential to identify the threat and provide timely threat warnings. This includes evaluation of terrorist capabilities, tactics and targeting strategy, and the dissemination of this information to all interested and affected agencies and organizations. Coordinated management of intelligence requirements will facilitate counterterrorism operations and preclude intelligence gaps.

Security. The goal of security is to hinder or deny terrorist access to a potential target. This includes measures taken by a military unit, an activity, or installation to protect both physical resources and personnel against terrorist acts. Fundamental to the effort to protect our forces and activities is an aggressive Operational Security (OPSEC) program.

Hostage Negotiations. Because of jurisdictional considerations, hostage negotiations will normally be the responsibility of the Department of State or of the host nation; however, specially trained personnel must be available for those instances when the DOD is given operational control during an incident. Such negotiations are designed to seek the release of the hostages without giving concessions. U.S. policy remains one of providing no concessions to terrorists.

Hostage Rescue. Specially organized, trained and equipped personnel and units must maintain the capacity to successfully penetrate terrorist organizations/strongholds to extract identified individuals held as a pledge that certain terms of agreements will be kept.

Assault Operations. An objective of national policy is to deter the terrorist through the threat of retaliation. When the National Command Authority (NCA) authorizes the attack of a terrorist organization in locations outside national borders, U.S. military personnel normally carry out the mission as a joint or combined operation.

Chapter VII

SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a common conceptual foundation with regard to support to insurgency to assist in the use of the LICII² Study through a wide range of user applications.

For our purposes, we have taken the definition of insurgency from Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, which defines insurgency as, "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict."

Not all insurgencies are harmful to the U.S. interests. We now find communist regimes which came to power through various forms of revolutionary warfare facing their own insurgent threat. These dynamic changes have rendered insurgency a more complex issue for the policymaker, military officer, and intelligence analyst.

When so instructed, U.S. military commanders must be prepared to assist in supporting an insurgency. To do so, they need the capability to identify root causes for insurgencies, assess the current situation, estimate the short- and long-term intentions, implement measures to foster the insurgency, and be able to foster these same capabilities in the host nation.

Insurgencies have become the most prevalent form of warfare in developing nations. If they take root, they are likely to be prolonged, which could institute profound implications for the political, social, and economic future of the impacted country. If an insurgency is successful and the national leadership is significantly altered, this may bring potentially unstable figures to power, leading to revolutionary changes with extended periods of turmoil or irresponsible government behavior. From this perspective, the U.S. must understand the dynamics and potential results of supporting insurgencies.

First, insurgencies differ greatly among themselves and may succeed or fail for a number of reasons. Understanding the political and ideological motivations and objections of the contending parties enables analysts to assess the impact of the conflict on U.S. interests and goals and to devise appropriate strategies. Knowledge of the nature of the conflict and the cultural and geographic environment are essential to provide constructive advice and determine appropriate support requirements.

Second, a revolutionary group seeking to mount an insurgency must, at a minimum: build an organization; recruit and train a network of leaders, or cadre; acquire supplies; and broadcast beliefs and goals.

Third, insurgencies seem to begin their struggle with certain inherent advantages which include:

- o The ability to offer a program or ideology that may be perceived by the population as superior to that of the current government.
- o Decentralized control which allows flexibility at the local level.
- o The ability to offer a degree of upward mobility to cadre recruits often not available in Third World government systems.
- o High motivation for tight security because survival depends on secrecy.

A detailed analysis and understanding of the political, military, cultural, and socioeconomic characteristics of a particular country is necessary to identify the signs of insurgent activity.

Fourth, insurgencies are not caused by external forces and do not require such help to prevail. However, external groups and states can play on the vulnerability of disaffected people and may offer materiel and political assistance to the insurgency. Each insurgency is unique with its own characteristics and objectives. Insurgents strategies vary from rural- to urban-based. This variance results from the assets available, the location of popular support, the conditions of the national economy, the strength of the government in various locations, and the philosophies and ideologies of the insurgency's leaders. Regardless, insurgencies succeed by mobilizing human and materiel resources to provide both active and passive support to the insurgent movement.

Fifth, traditional insurgency springs from tribal, ethnic, social, economic, political, religious, linguistic, or other similarly identifiable groups with very specific grievances. The insurgent leadership articulates these dissatisfactions, attempts to place blame on the existing government while convincing the people that the government cannot or will not act to remedy these dissatisfactions. A mass-oriented insurgency seeks to create political legitimacy from outside the existing system by challenging, destroying and ultimately supplanting it.

Finally, successful insurgencies usually pass through common phases of development. The classical phases of insurgency are: latent or incipient (Phase I), characterized by emerging leadership and infrastructure building; guerrilla warfare (Phase II), characterized by a transition to offensive hit and run tactics; and conventional warfare or a war of movement (Phase III).

Not all insurgencies experience each developmental phase to the same degree or in the same manner. Also, the phases may not be distinguishable in all cases. Evolution of any phase may extend over a long period of time. An insurgency may take decades to mature, and finally succeed or fail, and as the situation dictates, may regress to a lower phase, waiting for more favorable conditions before continuing.

The number of people involved in insurgent conflicts has grown at a significant rate. Not only has the number of insurgent organizations risen substantially (several countries have four or more major insurgent groups), but new organizations continue to emerge.

U.S. military support to insurgencies will only be successful when integrated and balanced with the programs undertaken by the political, economic, and informational elements of national power. Organizational structures for U.S. support for insurgent movements can be either overt, low visibility, clandestine, or covert. Such programs are subject to established procedures and standards for review, approval, coordination, and notification to Congress, and may be conducted as Special Activities. The infrastructure to provide support to an insurgent will, in all likelihood, not be DOD-managed, but may require DOD support. Whatever the case, conduct of such operations will be situation-specific and based on legal and policy criteria, which may require a Presidential finding and congressional notification.

To accomplish their mission according to Joint Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, U.S support to insurgency responsibilities occur in one or more of the following types of military operations:

Advisory and Training Assistance. The U.S. military can advise, train, and assist indigenous insurgent movements in appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures. These include guerrilla warfare, escape and evasion, subversion, sabotage, and the supporting disciplines of psychological operations and civil affairs.

Intelligence Support. Accurate, timely intelligence is essential to determine operational objectives. U.S. national and theater intelligence agencies are an invaluable source of intelligence for the insurgent movement. In return, the insurgent movement may be able to provide the U.S. military with technical and tactical intelligence only available through local means. Intelligence provided to the U.S. military from the resistance movement should include feedback and effectiveness reporting mechanisms to evaluate intelligence provided by insurgent movement field elements to U.S. support agencies.

Logistics Support. Each insurgent organization must develop its own system to meet its specific requirements and situation. In

general, an insurgent organization meets its logistics requirements by a combination of internal and external means. The U.S. military may be tasked to provide assistance in establishing a logistics support network.

C³ Systems Support. In the LIC environment, C³ systems support may take a variety of forms depending on the existing infrastructure. Technological advances in information collection, communications, and automated information systems make it possible to employ techniques such as low-probability of intercept communications, encoded information transmittal, and data correlations from a variety of sources. Different combinations of capabilities may be employed to fuse information from local operating sources and from centers remotely located from the area of operations.

Chapter VIII

SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a common conceptual foundation with regard to support to counterinsurgency and to assist in the use of the LICI² Study through a wide range of user applications.

For our purposes, we have taken the definition of counterinsurgency from Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, which defines counterinsurgency as, "Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civil actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency."

Insurgences are usually the breakdown of social, economic, and political infrastructures. Effective counterinsurgency strategies rely on bolstering (or creating) an infrastructure to meet the demands of the people and remain responsive to them. For this reason, a successful counterinsurgency campaign must be in coordination with the host nation, to include both military and civil operations.

The U.S. supports host nation counterinsurgency efforts based on the concept of internal defense and development (IDAD), which assumes the host nation is responsible for the execution of programs to prevent or defeat subversion, lawlessness, or insurgency. IDAD efforts can be simple and limited in scope when the threat is nominal, or quite complex, particularly when the insurgency is at an advanced stage of development. Because standard conventional military tactics and training may not always apply, responsibilities, structures, and procedures may be altered to facilitate the requirements of a counterinsurgency operation. Thus, when political and military counterinsurgency campaign goals come into conflict, the intricacy of counterinsurgency necessitates that political goals take precedence.

Insurgent wars are dynamic situations. Government forces must try to seize the initiative, be flexible, imaginative, and responsive to insurgent changes. Response is often hampered because the initial signs of an insurgency are not always apparent and often it takes governments a while to recognize that they do, in fact, have an insurgency on their hands. Accordingly, their strategy and tactics in suppressing the insurgency also tend to evolve slowly. So, when the military is directly involved in counterinsurgency operations that use government forces to conduct large operations, selectivity in activities must take precedence and intelligence must be substantial enough to justify the resource expenditure. For

example, occupying an insurgent area for short periods of time probably is of limited value as the insurgents just return when the host nation military leaves the area. Sound military leadership and discretion are also important to support government actions; otherwise, the populace may be alienated, thereby hindering counterinsurgency efforts.

The U.S. can provide a variety of resources to support counterinsurgency operations. The specific form and substance of U.S. support will depend on an evaluation of the insurgent movement and its potential, the host nation political situation, and stated U.S. policy. Support to counterinsurgency is a complex, dynamic issue. However, there are several constraints that are critical to the overall support to counterinsurgency mission. These include:

- o Armed insurgents are not the whole dimension of an insurgency. Thus, the military cannot be the whole dimension to counterinsurgency strategy.
- o The strategy and tactics of neither the insurgents nor the counterinsurgency forces can or will remain static over time.
- o Counterinsurgency operations are dependent on the government being committed to the counterinsurgency campaign, and willing to devote adequate resources, make certain sacrifices, and persevere in the pursuit of its objectives over an extended period.
- o Counterinsurgency military operations demand timely and extensive intelligence.

To accomplish their mission according to Joint Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, U.S. support to counterinsurgency responsibilities can occur in one or more of the following types of military operations:

Advisory and Training Assistance. Direct advisory assistance for a specific purpose, particularly such assistance related directly to a foreign military sales case, is provided by Training Assistance Field Teams, Technical Assistance Teams, Mobile Training Teams and Extended Training Service Specialists authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act. The mission of trainers is to impart specific skills which usually involves a direct application of appropriate tactics, techniques, procedures, and technical skills. Care should be exercised in tailoring the training and materiel support to the capabilities and the threat faced by the host nation. Training personnel must have an appreciation for the host nation's language and culture and be thoroughly versed in applicable U.S. political objectives.

Intelligence Support. Intelligence provides an essential foundation for all U.S. and host nation counterinsurgency plans and operations. Host nation intelligence is likely to be

relatively unsophisticated, relying mostly on human-resource intelligence. Commensurate with U.S. interests and objectives, foreign training and advisory assistance can significantly improve host nation intelligence capabilities. Where technical or political considerations restrict foreign training or advisory assistance and host nation intelligence capabilities are insufficient, U.S. supplied information may constitute the major portion of intelligence support to the host nation. Other support may involve assistance in building a military intelligence structure that operates effectively with other intelligence and security services.

Logistics Support. An effective counterinsurgency program will rely on mobilization of host nation personnel and resources. U.S. logistics personnel can advise and assist in the development of the host nation's production, maintenance, storage, distribution, and control mechanisms as well as facilitate the flow of U.S. materiel assistance.

Civil Military Operations. Civil Military Operations (CMO) involves decisive and timely employment of military capabilities to perform traditionally nonmilitary activities that can assist the host nation in depriving insurgents of their greatest weapon --disaffection of the populace. These activities can help bring about economic, political, and social stability as they encourage the development of the nation's materiel and human resources. The goal of CMO is to isolate the insurgent from the populace, thus depriving them of recruits, resources, intelligence and credibility. For maximum effectiveness, CMO plans and actions must be an integral part of early counterinsurgency activities. Successful early employment of CMO may reduce or eliminate the need for subsequent combat operations. As a fundamental precept, CMO must be closely coordinated with the Country Team and other U.S. government agencies. In all cases, actions by the U.S. Armed Forces must support the host nation's control over the program and enhance popular perceptions of stability and legitimacy. Civil military operations to support counterinsurgency operations may also be associated with disaster relief, civil defense, counterdrugs, and counterterrorism. In addition, the proper use of psychological operations enhances all aspects of CMO.

C³ Systems Support. A broad range of options are available for employing C³ systems to support counterinsurgency operations. They may range from providing radio equipment to assist a nation or friendly force in improving its field communications to extensive C³ upgrades including command posts, surveillance and warning sensors, as well as various communications and information collection and processing systems. Mobile as well as fixed-site equipment may be deployed. Airborne warning and control systems, and airborne command posts may be deployed to the area of operations. Satellite communication resources can be made available in areas lacking adequate long-range

communications. Support can be tailored to complement an indigenous force as well as support new forces introduced into the area.

U.S. Tactical Operations. Tactical operations by U.S. forces can provide security sufficient for the host nation to implement counterinsurgency programs. The object of these operations is to provide time and space for local forces to regain the initiative and resume the complete responsibility for security operations. Tactical operations may be conducted to limit external support to the insurgents and to protect U.S. interests. The host nation military plan and the U.S. military support plan must be combined to govern U.S. tactical operations. If the U.S. employs combat forces, they will only be assigned missions that support the security components of the IDAD strategy. A decision for U.S. combat forces to take the initiative must result from a clear decision to change the nature of the conflict and would require a conscious decision by the National Command Authority (NCA).

CHAPTER IX

PEACEKEEPING

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a common conceptual foundation with regard to peacekeeping to assist in the use of the LICI² Study through a wide range of user applications. Some information in this chapter was extracted from Joint Pub 3-07.3 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations), because it is more current than Joint Pub 3-07.

For our purposes, we have taken the definition of peacekeeping from Joint Pub 3-07, which defines peacekeeping as, "Efforts taken with the consent of the civil or military authorities of the belligerent parties in a conflict to maintain a negotiated truce in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve and maintain peace." [Note: Upon final CJCS approval of Joint Pub 3-07, this term will be included in Joint Pub 1-02.]

While there has been a great deal written on the subject in an attempt to gain a consensus on exactly what peacekeeping is, there remains no universally accepted definition. The absence of one specific definition has resulted in the term being used to describe almost any type of behavior intended to obtain what a particular nation regards as peace. However, distinction must be made between "peacekeeping" and "peacemaking." "Peacemaking" is a contingency operation to restore order and force a cessation of fighting.

The importance of peacekeeping in the control of conflict in a dangerous world cannot be overemphasized. Peacekeeping differs fundamentally from internal security in that a peacekeeping force and/or observers are neutral and therefore do not act in support of a government.

Peacekeeping efforts support diplomatic endeavors to achieve or to maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict and often involve ambiguous situations requiring the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a-participant.

There are certain conditions that must be present in order for peacekeeping operations to be successful. These conditions are:

- o Consent of the parties in the conflict.
- o The political recognition of the peacekeeping operation by most, if not all, of the international community.
- o A clear, restricted, and realistic mandate or mission.
- o Sufficient freedom of movement for the force or observers to carry out their responsibilities.
- o An effective command, control, and communications (C³) system.

- o Well trained, balanced, and impartial forces.
- o An effective and responsive all-source information gathering capability.

Peacekeeping activities must be entirely neutral. Once the reputation for impartiality is lost (either real or perceived), the usefulness of the peacekeeping mission is destroyed.

Peacekeeping forces may consist of combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Typically, a peacekeeping force is a combat unit supported by logistics and communications units under a joint headquarters. Peacekeeping forces are generally lightly equipped and may not be able to keep determined belligerents from fighting. In an observer role, they are unarmed. These facts, coupled with normally very restrictive rules of engagement (ROE), constantly place peacekeepers in jeopardy of being trapped in a potentially volatile situation. These situations are discussed later in this chapter.

Historically, the U.S. has maintained a deliberate policy to limit U.S. ground-force participation in order to preserve an atmosphere of nonpartisanship and avoid entanglement in superpower rivalries. The U.S.'s support, for the most part, includes providing supplies, money, and intertheater lift.

There are three broad missions the U.S. may perform in peacekeeping operations. They are providing peacekeeping support, observer missions, and peacekeeping forces.

In any peacekeeping role in which U.S. military forces will be committed, military commanders should understand any limits that have been imposed on their activities either by law (Title 22, U.S. Code) or policy. These limits will specify whether U.S. forces will engage in combatant activities or only in a support role.

The primary observation mission of the peacekeeping force is to monitor the terms of the protocol which established the peacekeeping operation. Military observers observe, record, and report implementation of the truce and any violations thereof.

Factual and impartial reporting constitute the cornerstone of successful peacekeeping operations. Observation requires the comprehension of the facts and their implications, as well as timely reporting to the next higher echelon. If one side suspects that the peacekeeping force, either deliberately or inadvertently, is giving information to the other side, then the peacekeeping force may face accusations of espionage. Additionally, one or both parties to the dispute may become so uncooperative that the success of the peacekeeping operation may be jeopardized.

In addition to monitoring the terms of the protocol, observers also carry out such additional tasks as vehicle patrols in sensitive areas, local negotiations between rival forces, and special investigations.

Vitally important to the success of any observation role is the establishment of a good working relationship with the contending parties; without it, it is doubtful if the role can be properly performed. An awareness of the population, its culture, language, politics, religion and what the peacekeepers might expect from the population (i.e., support, indifference, hostility) will be helpful. Additionally, authorized use of available facilities to support the peacekeeping force is essential.

The terms of reference, which govern the way a peacekeeping force operates, are derived from an analysis of the mandate and the situation. These terms of reference are often far less precise than is desirable from a military point of view. There are two reasons for this. First, sponsoring bodies usually consist of many separate countries--each of which may have its own idea of what the peacekeeping force should do according to its view of the rights and wrongs of the dispute. Secondly, the mandate for the peacekeeping force has to be framed in such a way that it does not give advantage to any side.

In any situation for which a peacekeeping initiative is mounted, the power of public information services in creating emotive response both inside and outside the area of operations cannot be underrated. The course of a dispute can be influenced by the injection of the wrong kind of information just as it can be corrected by the intelligent and diplomatic use of factual information. Crises may be averted when confirmed information is used to counter rumor and misrepresentation of fact.

Depending on the specific peacekeeping mission, there are several operational considerations. For example, psychological operations (PSYOP) can play an important role in facilitating cooperation between the parties to the dispute, along with their supporters, and the peacekeeping forces. Tactically, PSYOP can assist the peacekeeping force in keeping the peace through persuasion rather than intimidation.

Just as PSYOP is an important consideration, it seems reasonable to assume that a peacekeeping force should have a first class intelligence service. Unfortunately, this deduction is different when viewed from the perspective of peacekeeping politics, because it is argued that collecting information about people who do not wish to provide it is a hostile act and, that as the business of collecting it by covert means involves deceit, it destroys the trust which parties should have in the peacekeeping force. For these reasons, intelligence operations will not be conducted. Instead, the focus will be on information gathering

to protect the force from hostile elements who may not desire peace and, as a result, target the peacekeepers in order to rekindle hostilities. Information gathering, therefore, will primarily be directed towards the civilian population, sympathizers, terrorist groups, weapons used by the terrorist groups, or the extent of evidence of foreign support.

Personnel selected for a peacekeeping mission should be capable of operating under the stress and strains of this unique task. Peacekeeping requires skill, imagination, flexibility, adaptability, and patience. Training of individuals for peacekeeping duties should emphasize patience, flexibility, self-discipline, professionalism, impartiality, tact, and inquisitiveness. Training should also familiarize them with the dynamics of the political situation in the operating area, local culture, mores, religions, and taboos.

Peacekeeping calls for an adjustment of attitude and approach to a different set of circumstances from those normally found on the field of battle--an adjustment to suit the needs of a peaceable intervention rather than an enforcement action.

Although security may seem a minimal planning factor in peacekeeping, an avowedly open type of operation, it is just as important as it is in many other military operations. A peacekeeping force is vulnerable to the following security risks:

- o Peacekeeping forces have no means of checking the credibility of local employees who may be bribed or pressured to provide information on politically sensitive matters or on the opposite side's forces. Therefore, commanders must exercise great care when discussing peacekeeping force affairs and handling documents in the presence of local nationals.
- o Personnel who routinely visit the host nation should receive security briefings prior to their visits as well as security debriefings after their visits.

As the discussion above implies, peacekeeping is a complex and multifaceted mission. Individuals performing peacekeeping functions must be keenly aware of their environment and the sensitivities of all parties.

To accomplish their missions according to Joint Pub 3-07.3, JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations, the following types of military operations are associated with any peacekeeping effort:

Supervision of Free Territories. Attempts by nations to expand sovereign territorial boundaries may impede or threaten peaceful, international use of strategic maritime routes or airways. In such cases, international peacekeeping operations may be necessary as a temporary or permanent means of ensuring free access and usage.

Supervision of Cease-Fires. During a diplomatically arranged cease-fire, the peacekeeping force may observe and report on the belligerents' compliance with the cease-fire. The force may have to deploy on the territory of more than one nation to perform its mission. Consequently, it will frequently find itself involved on several levels in the mediation of disputes. Because the tempo and outcome of diplomatic activity to effect a cease-fire are unpredictable and because negotiations to constitute and insert the peacekeeping force may occur simultaneously, this function will require rapid strategic deployment. In the area of conflict, deployed troops must be initially self-sufficient, have the capability for self-defense, and have a comprehensive internal and external communications adaptable to the command and control systems established by the sponsor. Units and/or personnel with specialized skills and supporting supplies, vehicles, and equipment, such as mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal capability and engineer or decontamination equipment, may be needed.

Supervision of Withdrawals and Disengagements. As diplomatic activity ensues, agreement to establish a buffer zone may involve peacekeeping forces. In addition to command and control and self-defense capabilities, requirements will exist for mediation of local disagreements in positioning of belligerent forces, verification of troop and equipment dispositions, sustaining cease-fires, and assistance to the civilian population in the buffer zone.

Supervision of Prisoner of War Exchange. At any stage in the resolution of the dispute(s), peacekeeping forces may have to assist in the supervision of a prisoner of war exchange.

Supervision of Demilitarization and Demobilization. As diplomacy achieves resolution of disputes and warring nation(s) agree to demilitarization or demobilization, peacekeeping forces may have to conduct detection activities to monitor those functions and report their status to the sponsor.

Maintenance of Law and Order. International peacekeeping operations may be required to defuse potential armed conflict by providing for an orderly transfer of authority between belligerents. Agreements on such matters usually will require the consent of all the belligerents. This function may include requirements for the supervision of elections and the temporary administration of the host nation. In this role, peacekeeping force expertise in civil affairs and normal police functions are essential.

Chapter X

MASTER INSTABILITY INDICATORS LIST/MATRIX

- 1 INFORMANTS FAIL TO PASS ACCURATE INFORMATION
- 2 ATTACKS ON MISSION FORCE (E.G., RAIDS/AMBUSHES)
- 3 HARASSMENT OF MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL
- 4 JAILING/EXPULSION OF MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL
- 5 OPPOSITION FORCES TARGET GOVERNMENT PROJECTS
- 6 MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE
OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES OR PROGRAMS
- 7 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS OF LEADING OPPOSITION PARTY
CANDIDATES
- 8 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
- 9 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST PROMINENT, NON-GOVERNMENT
LEADER
- 10 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS ON MILITARY LEADERS
- 11 KIDNAPING OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
- 12 EXECUTION OF PROMINENT, NON-GOVERNMENT LEADERS/OFFICIALS
- 13 KIDNAPING OF PROMINENT BUSINESSMEN/NON-GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS/LEADERS
- 14 KILLING OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
- 15 KILLING OF PROMINENT, NON-GOVERNMENT LEADERS
- 16 ASSAULTS ON POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL
- 17 ASSAULTS ON MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL (E.G., MUGGINGS)
- 18 ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS
- 19 HOSTAGE TAKING
- 20 USE OF FEAR TACTICS TO COERCE SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION FORCE
- 21 USE OF FEAR TACTICS TO CONTROL LOCAL POPULACE
- 22 USE OF FEAR TACTICS TO CONTROL GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY

- 23 LABOR STRIKES
- 24 THEFT OR ALTERATION OF GOVERNMENT IDENTIFICATION CARDS
- 25 EVIDENCE OF FORGED PASSPORTS
- 26 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
- 27 USE OF MILITARY/GOVERNMENT EQUIPMENT IN ILLICIT OPERATIONS
- 28 EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION FROM REGION OR AREA OF CONFLICT
- 29 MASS URBAN-RURAL MIGRATION OR VICE VERSA
- 30 EXODUS/MIGRATION FROM CONTESTED AREAS
- 31 ARMED CONFRONTATION BY OPPOSITION FORCE WITHIN THE COUNTRY
- 32 MASSING OF OPPOSITION COMBATANTS
- 33 MEASURES TAKEN TO REMOVE GOVERNMENT LEADERS
- 34 REPEATED INCURSIONS OF OPPOSITION FORCE PERSONNEL INTO MISSION FORCE AREA
- 35 RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY LOCAL POPULACE IN RESPONSE TO ACTUAL/PERCEIVED MISSION FORCE TRANSGRESSIONS
- 36 WITHDRAWAL OF SPONSOR SUPPORT FOR MISSION FORCE REQUIREMENTS
- 37 CHANGES IN OPPOSITION FORCE OPERATING AREAS
- 38 SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN OPERATIONAL ROUTINE AMONG OPPOSITION FORCE
- 39 GENERAL NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD MISSION FORCE PRESENCE
- 40 ACTIONS DESIGNED TO GOAD GOVERNMENT INTO TAKING MEASURES TO DESTABILIZE THE SECURITY SITUATION
- 41 LOOTING
- 42 MASS DEMONSTRATIONS
- 43 RIOTING
- 44 EFFORTS TO INCITE RIOTS
- 45 RALLIES TO HONOR MARTYRED OPPOSITION LEADER OR REVOLUTIONARY HEROES
- 46 PAID AND/OR ARMED DEMONSTRATORS IN RIOTS

- 47 PUBLICIZED LISTS OF TARGETS FOR PLANNED OPPOSITION FORCE DEMONSTRATIONS
- 48 PRESENCE OF PHOTOGRAPHERS OTHER THAN ACCREDITED NEWSMEN AMONG DEMONSTRATORS
- 49 INFILTRATION OF STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS BY KNOWN AGITATORS
- 50 PUBLICATION OF FAKED OR ALTERED PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWING ANTI-MISSION FORCE THEMES
- 51 USE OF TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT TO INTERCEPT MISSION FORCE COMMUNICATIONS
- 52 RECURRING PATTERN OF WRONG NUMBER TELEPHONE CALLS TO AN EMBASSY
- 53 BROADCASTING IN THE CLEAR BY OPPOSITION FORCE
- 54 OPPOSITION FORCE INTENTIONAL USE OF KNOWN COMPROMISED COMMUNICATION CODES
- 55 USE OF FOREIGN/OBSCURE LANGUAGES/DIALECTS IN EFFORT TO ENSURE SECURITY OF OPPOSITION FORCE COMMUNICATIONS
- 56 CHANGE OF COMMUNICATION TRANSMITTING LOCATIONS
- 57 ROUTING OF ELECTRONIC MESSAGE TRAFFIC DIFFERS FROM ESTABLISHED PATTERN
- 58 SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN LEVEL OF COMMUNICATIONS NET ACTIVITY
- 59 A "SOLIDARITY" CAMPAIGN BY RADICAL GROUPS THAT UTILIZE TERRORISM
- 60 COMMUNICATIONS IN PREVIOUSLY UNUSED BANDS
- 61 CLANDESTINE ANTI-SPONSOR/ANTI-MISSION FORCE MEDIA BROADCASTS
- 62 ACTIVATION/USE OF CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
- 63 UNEXPLAINED INCREASE IN AMATEUR RADIO ACTIVITY
- 64 EFFORTS BY OPPOSITION FORCE TO EXPLOIT POOR MISSION FORCE OPSEC PRACTICES
- 65 OPPOSITION FORCES DESTROY COMMUNICATIONS/INFORMATION PROCESSING FACILITIES
- 66 INTENTIONAL OVERLOAD OF SPONSOR/MISSION FORCE INFORMATION CHANNELS BY OPPOSITION FORCE
- 67 RAPID UPGRADE OF INTER-GROUP COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES AMONG PRINCIPAL OPPOSITION GROUPS

- 68 RAPID UPGRADE OF COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY BY PRINCIPAL
OPPOSITION FORCE
- 69 MESSAGE TRAFFIC REQUESTING RESUPPLY
- 70 IRREGULAR ASSEMBLY OF SAME YEAR MILITARY ACADEMY GRADUATES
- 71 ALTERED COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES (INCLUDING COMSEC)
- 72 COMMUNICATIONS LINKS BETWEEN SPONSOR AND OPPOSITION FORCE
- 73 COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN OPPOSITION FORCES AND FOREIGN SUPPORT
GROUPS
- 74 ILLEGAL/UNLICENSED USE OF COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
- 75 INCREASED ACTIVITY ON OPPOSITION FORCE TACTICAL
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS
- 76 UNUSUAL ROUTING OF OPPOSITION FORCE MESSAGE TRAFFIC
- 77 INCREASED/UNUSUAL PURCHASE OF TACTICAL RADIO EQUIPMENT
- 78 SUDDEN INCREASE OF OPPOSITION FORCE VEHICLE READY RATES
- 79 CHANGE OF SECURE COMMUNICATIONS CODES
- 80 INITIATION OF COMMUNICATIONS "BLACK OUT"
- 81 SPONSOR RESTRICTION ON MISSION FORCE AUTHORITY TO MONITOR
OPPOSITION FORCES' COMMUNICATIONS
- 82 USE OF MISSION FORCE COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS BY OPPOSITION
FORCE TO MISDIRECT/CONFUSE MISSION FORCE OPERATIONAL EFFORTS
- 83 OPPOSITION FORCE MONITORING MISSION FORCE COMMUNICATIONS NET
- 84 OPPOSITION FORCE EXPLOITING POOR/IMPROPER MISSION FORCE
COMMUNICATIONS PRACTICE
- 85 USE OF BUGGING DEVICES IN MISSION FORCE COMMUNICATIONS
- 86 INCREASE IN OPPOSITION FORCE RECRUITING EFFORTS
- 87 INFORMATION MEDIA INSTALLATIONS CLOSED (E.G., RADIO/TV
STATIONS)
- 88 ABILITY OF OPPOSITION FORCE TO REMAIN IN THE FIELD/CONDUCT
OPERATIONS WITHOUT TRADITIONAL SUPPLY
- 89 FINANCIAL SUPPORT OR OTHER RESOURCES FROM ILLICIT ACTIVITIES
(E.G., DRUG TRAFFICKING)

- 90 INTRODUCTION OF NEW CAPABILITY TO OPPOSITION FORCE
- 91 SHUTDOWN OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES
- 92 SHUTDOWN OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
- 93 DISRUPTION OF GOVERNMENT UTILITIES
- 94 FOOD SHORTAGES
- 95 DISCOVERY OF SUPPLY CACHES
- 96 USE OF VEHICLE CONVOYS
- 97 OPPOSITION FORCE CONFISCATION OF MATERIEL FROM CIVILIAN POPULATION
- 98 MILITARY DESERTIONS
- 99 UNUSUAL/UNEXPLAINED ACTIVITY AT TARGET RANGES OR SIMILAR INDICATIONS OF THE USE OF WEAPONS
- 100 THEFT OF COMMERCIAL HARDWARE OF OPERATIONAL VALUE
- 101 THEFT OF GOVERNMENT MILITARY HARDWARE BY NON-SPONSOR FORCES
- 102 FAILURE TO FILE LIGHT AIRCRAFT FLIGHT PLANS
- 103 USE OF SPECIAL/SOPHISTICATED COMBAT EQUIPMENT BY GROUPS NOT NORMALLY ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH EQUIPMENT
- 104 FOREIGN CONTRIBUTION OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS
- 105 FALSIFIED SHIPPING/SALES DOCUMENTS
- 106 CREATION OF NEW/TEMPORARY SUPPLY POINTS
- 107 PREPOSITIONED SUPPLIES/EQUIPMENT
- 108 UNUSUAL MOVEMENT OF OPPOSITION FORCE PERSONNEL/UNITS
- 109 UNUSUAL MOVEMENT OF OPPOSITION FORCE MATERIEL/EQUIPMENT
- 110 CREATION/EXPANSION OF MATERIEL STOCKPILES
- 111 KILLING OF LEADING OPPOSITION PARTY CANDIDATES
- 112 CHANGES IN OPPOSITION FORCE COMBATANT READINESS
- 113 POSITIONING OF CRITICAL COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS BY SUPPORTING BELLIGERENT WITHOUT PRIOR COORDINATION WITH PEACEKEEPING FORCE

- 114 SABOTAGE/TERRORISM EFFORTS/ACTIONS
- 115 UNUSUAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS AMONG CIVILIAN POPULACE
- 116 OPPOSITION FORCE RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY AGAINST MISSION FORCE
- 117 POVs AND COMMERCIAL VEHICLES MODIFIED FOR COMBAT USE
- 118 PARACHUTE DELIVERY OF CARGO FROM AIRCRAFT
- 119 UNUSUAL CARGO DELIVERIES AT NIGHT
- 120 CARGO DELIVERIES IN REMOTE/UNUSUAL LOCATION
- 121 CARGO DELIVERIES CONDUCTED BY ARMED INDIVIDUALS
- 122 SHORTAGES OF USUALLY AVAILABLE TRANSPORTATION
- 123 SHORTAGES OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
- 124 MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO OPPOSITION FORCE EFFORTS DEMOGRAPHICALLY BASED (E.G., ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION FORCE CENTERED IN MIDDLE CLASS)
- 125 EFFORTS BY SPONSOR TO GAIN OVERLY CLOSE TIES WITH MISSION FORCE
- 126 UNOFFICIAL GENERAL CURFEW (E.G., URBAN)
- 127 CURFEWS IMPOSED BY GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
- 128 CURFEWS IMPOSED BY NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
- 129 TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
- 130 SELF-INITIATED GENERAL CURFEWS (URBAN)
- 131 TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY NON-GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
- 132 UNUSUAL CHANGES IN LOCAL MERCHANT BUSINESS HOURS
- 133 DEVIATION OF OPPOSITION FORCE SUPPLY VEHICLES FROM SCHEDULED ROUTES
- 134 NEW/STRANGE/OUT-OF-AREA VEHICLES IN THE AREA
- 135 THEFT OF MISSION FORCE VEHICLES
- 136 COVERT BORDER CROSSINGS
- 137 FALSIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

- 138 ESTABLISHMENT AND USE OF NEW TRUCK PARK(S)
- 139 COVERT CROSS-BORDER SHIPMENTS
- 140 PRESENCE OF FOREIGN NATIONAL KIA COMBATANTS
- 141 USE OF DIFFERENT/NEW COMBAT MATERIEL
- 142 RADICAL YOUTH GATHERINGS
- 143 UNEXPLAINED LARGE GATHERINGS
- 144 UNUSUAL GATHERING OF OPPOSITION FORCE LEADERS
- 145 PRESENCE OF KNOWN OPPOSITION FORCE LEADERS
- 146 UNUSUAL PATTERNS OR CHANGES IN WORKER ABSENTEEISM
- 147 NEW/STRENGTHENED CONNECTIONS BETWEEN OPPOSITION FORCE ORGANIZATIONS
- 148 CLOSING BORDERS (E.G., NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL)
- 149 UNEXPLAINED EXPLOSIONS, ESPECIALLY IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS
- 150 DESTRUCTION OF PHYSICAL TARGETS (E.G., BRIDGES, DAMS, AIRPORTS, BUILDINGS)
- 151 OPPOSITION FORCE'S USE OF HIGH-EXPLOSIVES
- 152 USE OF HIGH TECH EQUIPMENT (E.G., NIGHT VISION DEVICES, HIGH EXPLOSIVES)
- 153 PURCHASES OR THEFT OF DEMOLITION MATERIEL/EXPLOSIVES AND EQUIPMENT
- 154 THEFT OF SPONSOR/MISSION FORCE MATERIELS
- 155 FORMATION OF PRO-OPPOSITION PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
- 156 INCREASED/UNUSUAL USE OF TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
- 157 DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, INSTALLATIONS, OR THE HOMES OF BUSINESS LEADERS
- 158 ATTEMPTS BY OPPOSITION FORCES TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS FROM SPONSOR/MISSION FORCE
- 159 EXHORTATIONS FOR YOUTHS TO REFRAIN FROM JOINING THE MILITARY AND FOR SOLDIERS TO GO AWOL AND/OR DESERT
- 160 INTENTIONAL POISONING OF LOCAL WATER SUPPLIES

- 161 ESTABLISHMENT OF ROADBLOCKS BY OPPOSITION FORCES
- 162 PLANTING OF MINES
- 163 LOCAL/REGIONAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY OPPOSITION FORCE
- 164 PRESENCE OF PETITIONS AND PAMPHLETS THAT PROMOTE THE BELIEFS AND POLICIES OF A FOREIGN POWER
- 165 SUSPICIOUS/UNUSUAL PRESENCE OF INDIVIDUALS TAKING PICTURES OF MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL OR FACILITIES
- 166 SURVEILLANCE OF MISSION FORCE FACILITIES/OPERATIONS
- 167 GOVERNMENT WITHHOLDING OF PREVIOUSLY READILY AVAILABLE INFORMATION
- 168 EXPRESSIONS OF INTENT BY OPPOSITION FORCES
- 169 OPPOSITION FORCE DEMONSTRATES INTEREST IN TARGETING MISSION FORCE
- 170 OPPOSITION FORCE EFFORT TO SOLICIT INFORMATION FROM MISSION FORCE
- 171 ACTIONS BY OPPOSITION FORCE TO ELICIT SUPPORT FROM LOCAL/GENERAL POPULACE
- 172 SURGE IN OFFICIAL MESSAGE TRAFFIC, IN-COUNTRY AND/OR TO OVERSEAS EMBASSIES
- 173 MIX AND MATCH OPERATIONS BY OPPOSITION FORCE IN EFFORT TO BE UNPREDICTABLE TO AVOID AN IDENTIFIABLE PATTERN
- 174 EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT/WEAKEN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MISSION FORCE
- 175 STAGED EVENTS TO EXPLOIT MEDIA
- 176 OPPOSITION FORCE CONTROLLED PRESS PUBLISHES NEGATIVE OR BIASED STORIES INVOLVING/DIRECTED AT U.S./MISSION FORCES
- 177 SPONSOR SUPPRESSION OF INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY DISSEMINATED OR AVAILABLE TO MISSION FORCE
- 178 PRESENCE OF ANTI-SPONSOR/ANTI-U.S./ANTI-MISSION FORCE PUBLICATIONS
- 179 LEAKAGE OF SENSITIVE/CLASSIFIED MISSION FORCE RELEVANT INFORMATION TO THE NEWS MEDIA
- 180 NON-GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION FORCE LEADERS APPEAR IN PUBLIC AND OPENLY DECLARE THEMSELVES IN CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY

- 181 FOREIGN PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS DESIGNED TO DESTABILIZE
SECURITY SITUATION
- 182 UNSOLICITED ANTI-MISSION FORCE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO
FOREIGN PRESS
- 183 CIRCULATION OF WRITINGS CALLING FOR THE REMOVAL OF MISSION
FORCE
- 184 PUBLICITY EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT U.S./SPONSOR TIES
- 185 EFFORTS TO TARGET KEY COMMUNICATIONS NODES/TERMINALS
- 186 SPONSOR WITHHOLDING OF PERTINENT OPERATIONAL PLANNING
INFORMATION
- 187 DISRUPTION OF COMMUNICATION CHANNELS (E.G., JAMMING)
- 188 UNTIMELY RELEASE OF KEY OPERATIONAL INFORMATION BY SPONSOR
- 189 DISINFORMATION EFFORT BY OPPOSITION FORCE
- 190 "FEEDING" FALSE INFORMATION TO MISSION FORCE IN AN EFFORT TO
NEUTRALIZE OR REDUCE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
- 191 COVERT MEETINGS/COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
AND KNOWN OR SUSPECTED OPPOSITION FORCE ASSOCIATES/
SYMPATHIZERS
- 192 CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT, AND DECEPTION EFFORTS
- 193 RATIONING OF FOOD, FUEL, OR OTHER BASIC COMMODITIES IMPOSED
BY GOVERNMENT
- 194 WORSENING OF DIPLOMATIC TIES
- 195 INCREASE IN SMUGGLING
- 196 IN-COUNTRY TRAINING OF OPPOSITION FORCE BY FOREIGN NATIONALS
- 197 FOREIGN NATIONALS CONDUCT OPERATIONS WITH OPPOSITION FORCE
- 198 UNIDENTIFIED, UNSCHEDULED AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS OBSERVED
- 199 AIRCRAFT ACTIVITY IN UNUSUAL LOCATIONS (E.G., ROADWAY,
ABANDONED AIRFIELD)
- 200 SIGHTINGS/REPORTS OF CONVOY TRAFFIC
- 201 ESTABLISHMENT AND USE OF FUEL DUMPS
- 202 FOREIGN TRAINING OF COMBATANT PERSONNEL

- 203 UNUSUALLY HIGH PURCHASES OF COMBAT-RELATED ITEMS
- 204 ILLEGAL WEAPONS TRANSACTIONS
- 205 USE OF "NON-TRADITIONAL" COMBATANTS (E.G., CHILDREN)
- 206 USE OF "HUMAN SHIELD" TACTIC IN COMBAT OPERATIONS
- 207 USE OF RECOGNIZED SANCTUARIES BY OPPOSITION FORCES
- 208 INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES IN
OPPOSITION FORCE OPERATIONS
- 209 USE OF PROSTITUTES FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PURPOSE
- 210 USE OF FOREIGN PROFESSIONAL "OPERATIVES" (E.G., MERCENARIES)
- 211 USE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES TO GENERATE REVENUE/FINANCIAL
SUPPORT
- 212 SABOTAGE OF NATURAL RESOURCES
- 213 GOVERNMENT INITIATES REPRESSIVE POLICIES
- 214 SUDDEN CHANGES IN VEHICULAR TRAFFIC PATTERNS
- 215 OPPOSITION FORCES SUPPORT ACTIONS (E.G., UPRISINGS, STRIKES,
RIOTS) ATTRIBUTABLE TO DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
- 216 OPPOSITION FORCE PRIMARY AREA OF OPERATIONS RURAL ORIENTED
- 217 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CERTAIN GEOGRAPHIC AREAS MAINTAINED
BY OPPOSITION FORCE
- 218 OPPOSITION FORCE PRIMARY AREA OF OPERATIONS URBAN ORIENTED
- 219 BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
- 220 CLEARLY DEFINED MILITARY FRONTS OR AREAS OF OPERATION/
CONTROL
- 221 EXISTENCE OR QUASI-OFFICIAL ENCOURAGEMENT OF "DEATH SQUADS"
- 222 OPPOSITION FORCES CLAIM CONTROL OVER ISOLATED REGIONS
- 223 OPPOSITION FORCE'S EFFORTS TO GAIN OVERLY CLOSE TIES WITH
MISSION FORCE
- 224 UNUSUAL PUBLIC SECURITY PRACTICES IN MISSION FORCE AREA OF
INTEREST
- 225 FOREIGN OFFERS OF SAFE HAVENS/SANCTUARIES FOR OPPOSITION
FORCE

- 226 THREATS AGAINST ANNOUNCED ELECTIONS
- 227 CALLS FOR IMPEACHMENT/RESIGNATION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
- 228 CALLS FOR RETALIATION AGAINST SPONSOR SUPPORT TO MISSION FORCE
- 229 ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIALIZED UNITS BY OPPOSITION FORCE
- 230 GOVERNMENT SANCTIONED HARASSMENT OF NON-VIOLENT ANTI-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS BY SECURITY FORCES
- 231 OPPOSITION FORCE'S SURVEILLANCE OF SENIOR SPONSOR/MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL
- 232 COVERT EFFORTS TO CHANGE THE OFFICIAL DEMARCATION OF THE CONTESTED AREA
- 233 UNAUTHORIZED EFFORTS TO REMOVE MUNITIONS/WEAPONS CONFISCATED BY THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE DURING A DISARMAMENT PROCESS
- 234 EFFORTS TO COVERTLY TRANSPORT UNAUTHORIZED NUMBERS/TYPES OF WEAPONS INTO A LIMITED ARMAMENT ZONE
- 235 ATTEMPTS BY ONE OPPOSITION FORCE GROUP TO OBTAIN TACTICAL LOCATION DATA ON OPPOSING BELLIGERENT'S WEAPONS IN LIMITED ARMAMENT ZONE
- 236 A PEACEKEEPING SPONSOR IMPOSES CONDITIONS ON THE MANNER IN WHICH INSPECTIONS/MONITORING ARE CONDUCTED
- 237 VIOLATIONS OF CEASE-FIRE LINES
- 238 BREACHES OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS
- 239 ILLEGAL ENTRY OR OCCUPATION OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES
- 240 STEALING FARM STOCK AND ANIMALS
- 241 CREATION OF NEW COMBAT POSITIONS AFTER CEASE-FIRE
- 242 VIOLATIONS OF STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT BY MISSION FORCE
- 243 GOVERNMENT OFFER TO DISCUSS POWER SHARING WITH NON-SPONSOR OPPOSITION FORCE
- 244 GOVERNMENT CONCILIATORY OFFERS TO ANTI-SPONSOR GROUPS
- 245 SPONSOR REQUEST FOR CONCILIATORY OFFERS FROM OPPOSITION FORCE
- 246 INFILTRATION OF LABOR UNIONS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS BY OPPOSITION FORCE AGENTS

- 247 SOLICITATION OF MILITARY/SECURITY/GOVERNMENT/BUSINESS
PERSONNEL WITH UNUSUAL PURCHASE REQUESTS (E.G., UNIFORMS,
WEAPONS)
- 248 EFFORTS TO CREATE NEW POLITICAL PARTIES
- 249 CHANGES IN OPPOSITION FORCES INFORMATION (PROPAGANDA)
EFFORTS
- 250 NUMBERS OF FOREIGN NATIONALS IN AREA
- 251 DISCOVERY OF "SAFE HOUSE"
- 252 INFILTRATION/CO-OPTING OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES BY OPPOSITION
FORCE
- 253 PAYMENTS TO LOCALS PARTICIPATING IN OPPOSITION FORCE
ACTIVITY
- 254 PAYMENTS TO LOCALS INVOLVED IN SUPPORTING OPPOSITION FORCE
ACTIVITIES (E.G., PROVIDING FOOD, INFORMATION)
- 255 ARMED ROBBERIES AND EXTORTION
- 256 EFFORTS TO GAIN UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO MISSION FORCE
OPERATIONAL PLANS
- 257 TAMPERING WITH MAIL
- 258 INTERFERENCE WITH ELECTIONS
- 259 UNEXPLAINED/REPEATED DELAYS IN VISA ISSUANCE
- 260 ARMED CONFRONTATION BY ORGANIZED FORCES WITHIN THE COUNTRY
- 261 POSTPONEMENT/CANCELLATION OF DIPLOMATIC VISIT TO U.S./UN/
THIRD COUNTRY
- 262 SUSPECT RESIDENCES SPORADICALLY OCCUPIED
- 263 PRESENCE OF RADICAL POLITICAL FACTIONS
- 264 PUBLIC VANDALISM/HOOLIGANISM
- 265 VANDALIZING GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
- 266 INCREASE IN RADICAL ACTIVITY OR RECRUITING IN UNIVERSITIES
- 267 SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN OPPOSITION FORCE NORMAL OPERATING
PROCEDURES
- 268 EXPLOITATION OF SPONSOR/MISSION FORCE PERSONAL "WEAKNESSES"
TO PLACE MISSION AT RISK

- 269 OPPOSITION FORCE SELECTION OF BASE-OF-OPERATIONS SITES DESIGNED TO COMPLICATE/RESTRICT MISSION FORCE EFFORTS (E.G., USE OF HOSPITAL AS BASE-OF-OPERATIONS)
- 270 ACTIONS CONDUCTED AGAINST POPULACE TO REDUCE SUPPORT TO MISSION FORCE EFFORTS
- 271 USE OF SUICIDE MISSIONS (E.G., TERRORIST BEING "RIGGED" AS HUMAN BOMB)
- 272 OPPOSITION FORCES CONDUCT DIVERSIONARY ACTIONS TO DISGUISE PRIMARY OPERATION (E.G., PERMITS DETECTION OF A COVER OR "RED HERRING" OPERATION)
- 273 OPPOSITION FORCES CONDUCT MULTIPLE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO OVERLOAD MISSION FORCE CAPABILITIES
- 274 OPPOSITION FORCES CONDUCT MULTIPLE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO SPLIT MISSION FORCE
- 275 EFFORTS BY OPPOSITION FORCE ELEMENTS TO GAIN INFORMATION/ OPERATIONS DATA FROM MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL
- 276 OPPOSITION FORCE CONDUCTS OPERATIONS USING UP TO PLATOON SIZE UNITS
- 277 OPPOSITION FORCE CONDUCTS OPERATIONS USING UP TO COMPANY SIZE UNITS
- 278 OPPOSITION FORCE CONDUCTS OPERATIONS USING UP TO BATTALION SIZE UNITS
- 279 REPLACEMENT OF KEY GOVERNMENT LEADERS
- 280 PRESENCE OF HARDCORE FOREIGN NATIONAL OPPOSITION SUPPORTERS
- 281 MISSION FORCE PERIMETER DEFENSE PERFORMED BY NON-U.S. PERSONNEL
- 282 SPONSOR MANPOWER SHORTAGE
- 283 USE OF GUARD DOGS FOR BASE-OF-OPERATIONS SECURITY
- 284 USE OF ARMED GUARDS FOR BASE-OF-OPERATIONS SECURITY
- 285 USE OF ALARM SENSORS FOR BASE-OF-OPERATIONS SECURITY
- 286 USE OF ELECTRIFIED FENCES FOR BASE-OF-OPERATIONS SECURITY
- 287 USE OF ELECTRICAL VISUAL MONITORING DEVICES FOR BASE-OF- OPERATIONS SECURITY
- 288 USE OF EXTERNAL ROVING PATROLS FOR BASE-OF-OPERATIONS SECURITY

- 289 USE OF LOCAL NATIONAL WARNING SYSTEM FOR BASE-OF-OPERATIONS SECURITY (BLOCK WATCH)
- 290 NO EFFORTS TO AVOID KILLING OF CIVILIANS IN OPPOSITION FORCE OPERATIONS
- 291 ACTIVE TARGETING OF MISSION FORCE UNITS
- 292 USE OF PLAIN CLOTHES OPERATIONS IN EFFORT TO BLEND INTO LOCAL POPULACE
- 293 PUBLISHED WRITINGS OF OPPOSITION FORCE ORGANIZATION WHICH INDICATE ORGANIZATION'S IDEOLOGICAL BASIS
- 294 ORGANIZATIONAL ACCEPTANCE THAT THE END JUSTIFIES THE MEANS
- 295 ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL PARTY OR ACTION GROUP WHOSE GOALS/OBJECTIVES ARE NOT ACHIEVABLE WITHIN THE EXISTING POLITICAL SYSTEM
- 296 SUSPENDED/CANCELED ELECTIONS
- 297 RECRUITMENT OF SPONSOR/MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL
- 298 SPONSOR AUSTERITY MEASURES MET WITH PUBLIC HOSTILITY
- 299 NON-GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS IMPLEMENT PROGRAMS TO CIRCUMVENT GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY
- 300 SYSTEMATIC TRAINING OF OPPOSITION PERSONNEL
- 301 ATTEMPTS BY OPPOSITION ELEMENTS TO CONTROL/DEVELOP CONNECTIONS WITH ESTABLISHED ORGANIZATIONS
- 302 PRESENCE OF NON-GOVERNMENT MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS
- 303 LOCALS TRAINED IN PRO-OPPOSITION FORCE COUNTRIES
- 304 DEMAND FOR SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION ON THE OPEN MARKET
- 305 LARGE-SCALE DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD AND CLOTHING BY OPPOSITION ORGANIZATIONS
- 306 PRESENCE OF COUNTERFEIT MONEY
- 307 LARGE-SCALE PURCHASE OF FOOD STUFFS BY OTHER THAN WHOLESALE BUYERS
- 308 PURCHASE OF SURPLUS MILITARY GOODS
- 309 UNUSUAL DISAPPEARANCE OF YOUNG ADULTS

- 310 EFFORTS TO OBTAIN SPECIALIZED STORAGE FACILITIES
(E.G., MEDICAL)
- 311 USE OF SPECIALIZED STORAGE FACILITIES (E.G., MEDICAL)
- 312 REQUESTS TO FOREIGN MANUFACTURE/SOURCES FOR MATERIEL
(E.G., POSSIBLY SHIP AND STORE IN THIRD COUNTRY/INDIRECT
SHIPPING)
- 313 PRESENCE OF OPPOSITION FORCE MATERIEL IN LOCAL ECONOMY
- 314 SIGNIFICANT GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN OPERATIONAL CONDITION OF
OPPOSITION FORCE EQUIPMENT
- 315 ACTIONS BY SPONSOR/U.S. WHICH MIGHT EVOKE A TERRORIST ACT
- 316 ANNIVERSARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENT (E.G., DEATH OF A
TERRORIST LEADER, FOUNDED OF THE MOVEMENT, NATIONAL DAY, OR
U.S. HOLIDAY)
- 317 DOMESTIC MUNITIONS/ARMS SALES INCREASES
- 318 FOREIGN GOVERNMENT/LEADERS OPENLY SUPPORT RETURN TO
TIES/OPPOSE PRESENCE OF MISSION FORCE OPERATIONS
- 319 LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE HIERARCHICALLY BASED
- 320 SEIZURE OF PRESS FACILITIES BY OPPOSITION FORCE
- 321 DISCARDED SHIPPING CONTAINERS IN ISOLATED AREAS
- 322 USE OF SOPHISTICATED VERSUS SIMPLE MATERIEL
- 323 OPPOSITION FORCE WILLINGNESS TO GO FORCE-ON-FORCE AGAINST
SPONSOR/MISSION FORCE SECURITY FORCES
- 324 UNEXPLAINED ABSENCE OF SKILLED PROFESSIONALS USEFUL TO AN
INSURGENCY (E.G., PRINTERS, GUNSMITHS, MEDICAL
PROFESSIONALS)
- 325 UNUSUAL SYSTEMATIC PURCHASE OF CLOTHING MATERIALS, POSSIBLY
INDICATING LARGE-SCALE UNIFORM MANUFACTURING
- 326 TRAVEL OF KNOWN OPPOSITION FORCE PERSONNEL INTO REMOTE OR
ISOLATED AREAS
- 327 INCREASED TRAVEL BY SUSPECTED SUBVERSIVES TO OPPOSITION-
ORIENTED COUNTRIES
- 328 INTENTIONAL DAMAGE TO INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND
EQUIPMENT
- 329 MASS ORGANIZATIONS CREATED TO SUPPORT/SUSTAIN THE OPPOSITION
GOVERNMENT

- 330 OPPOSITION FORCES ESTABLISH CONNECTIONS WITH ESTABLISHED POLITICAL PARTIES, LABOR UNIONS, THE CHURCH
- 331 CHANGE IN STAFF AND ACTIVITIES IN PRO-OPPOSITION-ORIENTED EMBASSIES OR CONSULATES IN THE SPONSOR COUNTRY
- 332 DISAPPEARANCE OF KNOWN OR SUSPECTED OPPOSITION FORCE PERSONNEL
- 333 THE KILLING, ATTEMPTED KILLING, OR CAPTURE OF A LEADER OR SPOKESMAN OF A CAUSE ESPOUSED BY TERRORISTS
- 334 CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP STYLE/STRUCTURE (E.G., MISSION/PEOPLE ORIENTED)
- 335 UNUSUAL PRESENCE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS IN AREA
- 336 USE OF TRAINING MANUALS/DOCUMENTS/TRAINING AIDS
- 337 NON-MILITARY MEMBERS CONDUCTING MILITARY-TYPE DRILLING/PHYSICAL TRAINING EXERCISES
- 338 FOREIGN GOVERNMENT/LEADERS OPENLY VOICE SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION FORCE
- 339 FOREIGN/UNKNOWN INDIVIDUALS PRESENT WITHOUT VISIBLE MEANS OF SUPPORT, INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL ACTIVITY
- 340 BLACK MARKET ACTIVITIES
- 341 ANTI-MISSION FORCE/ANTI-SPONSOR MEDIA BROADCASTS
- 342 SURVEILLANCE OF POTENTIAL OPPOSITION FORCE TARGETS BY NON-MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL
- 343 INDICATIONS OF PREFERENCE FOR ISOLATED VERSUS NON-ISOLATED TARGETS
- 344 DOMESTIC OFFERS OF SAFE HAVENS/SANCTUARIES FOR OPPOSITION GROUPS
- 345 CALLS FOR THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT
- 346 OPPOSITION FORCE PROBING POTENTIAL TARGET SECURITY LEVELS/COVERAGE
- 347 OVERT EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT
- 348 CLAIMS OF CREDIT FOR TERRORIST ACTS
- 349 EFFORTS TO INTERRUPT/DEGRADE ROAD NETWORK
- 350 LACK OF COVER AND CONCEALMENT CAPABILITY

- 351 SURVEILLANCE OF U.S. PERSONNEL OF ANY RANK
- 352 SURVEILLANCE OF U.S. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS
- 353 LACK OF EQUITABLE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION
- 354 CALL FOR LABOR STRIKES TO DENOUNCE GOVERNMENT
- 355 LAND RIGHTS VIOLATIONS/GRIEVANCES
- 356 OPPOSITION PARTIES UNITE IN AN ATTEMPT TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT
- 357 WORLDWIDE PROPAGANDA BY OPPOSITION COUNTRIES DENOUNCING CONDITIONS AND BLAMING THE SPONSOR GOVERNMENT OF THE TARGET COUNTRY
- 358 CONTESTED RIGHTS TO NATURAL RESOURCES
- 359 INADEQUATELY TRAINED SPONSOR PERSONNEL
- 360 CHANGES IN OVERT FOREIGN SUPPORT
- 361 GENERAL HOARDING OF FOOD AND OTHER VITAL ITEMS
- 362 MILITARY DISSENSION
- 363 THREATS DIRECTED AT POLITICAL OFFICIALS
- 364 MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIANS FOR OPPOSITION FORCE COMBAT SERVICE
- 365 SHORTAGE OF SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION ON THE OPEN MARKET
- 366 FOREIGN SALES OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS TO OPPOSITION FORCE
- 367 DISCOVERY OF OPPOSITION FORCE SUPPLY POINTS
- 368 VOTES OF NO-CONFIDENCE
- 369 UNEXPLAINED COMMERCIAL WAREHOUSE LOSSES OF MATERIEL THAT IS OF OPERATIONAL VALUE TO OPPOSITION FORCE
- 370 EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN SUPPLIES/MATERIEL NOT AVAILABLE THROUGH LEGITIMATE CHANNELS
- 371 KEY OPPOSITION FORCE LEADERS UNEXPECTEDLY LEAVING THE COUNTRY
- 372 INCREASED TIES TO FOREIGN SUPPORT GROUPS
- 373 FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING OF OPPOSITION GROUPS

- 374 ELECTION RIOTS
- 375 INTERCEPTION OF CONTRABAND ARMS SHIPMENT
- 376 CHANGES IN BALLOT CASTING (E.G., VOTER TURNOUT)
- 377 SIGNIFICANT OR UNUSUAL DEPOSITS/WITHDRAWALS OF FUNDS FROM BANKS/SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS KNOWN TO HAVE OPPOSITION GROUP ACCOUNTS
- 378 INCREASE IN POPULAR SUPPORT FOR RULING GOVERNMENT
- 379 UNEXPECTED RESIGNATIONS BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
- 380 SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN TRANSPORTATION CAPABILITY
- 381 PUBLIC/OFFICIAL ANTI-GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FROM GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
- 382 INCREASE IN SIZE OF EMBASSY OR CONSULATE STAFF FROM COUNTRY OR COUNTRIES THAT SUPPORT OPPOSITION FORCE
- 383 OPPOSITION FORCE ACTIONS TO DISCREDIT GOVERNMENT LEADERS
- 384 POPULAR SYMPATHY/SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION FORCE
- 385 EVIDENCE OF OPPOSITION FORCE LEADERS HAVING LEGITIMATE INFLUENCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT
- 386 LOCALIZED "POCKETS" OF SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION FORCE ACTIVITY
- 387 EVIDENCE OF OPPOSITION FORCE LEADERS HAVING CLOSE TIES (E.G., PAST ASSOCIATION) WITH GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
- 388 SIGNIFICANT GROWTH OF ACTIVE OPPOSITION FORCE
- 389 GROWTH OF OPPOSITION FORCE SUPPORT BASE
- 390 FOREIGN COUNTRY ENGAGES IN ACTIVITY OPPOSING KNOWN U.S. INTERESTS IN THE SPONSOR COUNTRY
- 391 EVIDENCE THAT OPPOSITION FORCES HAVE RESERVE FORCE STRUCTURE/REPLACEMENT SYSTEM
- 392 UNAUTHORIZED EFFORTS TO REMOVE MUNITIONS/WEAPONS CONFISCATED BY MISSION FORCE DURING A DISARMAMENT PROCESS
- 393 SOFTENING OR HARDENING OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO TERRORISTS OR THEIR CAUSE
- 394 FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CHOOSES ONE FACTION AMONG COMPETING SIDES IN THE SPONSOR COUNTRY TO SUPPORT AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT

- 395 OPPOSITION FORCES TARGET OTHER ANTI-SPONSOR FORCE LEADERS
- 396 OPPOSITION FORCES CO-OPT OR ELIMINATE LEADERS OR OTHER GROUPS WITHIN THE RADICAL COALITION
- 397 HOSTILE AGENT INFILTRATION OF SPONSOR/MISSION FORCE ORGANIZATION
- 398 GOVERNMENT FORCES MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER CITIES, ALLOWING OPPOSITION FORCE FREE REIN IN THE COUNTRYSIDE
- 399 GOVERNMENT PERSECUTES SCAPEGOATS FOR PROGRAM FAILURES
- 400 OPPOSITION FORCE CO-OPT OR REPLACE THE INCUMBENT BUREAUCRACY
- 401 DISCOVERY OF OPPOSITION FORCE TRAINING MANUALS/ DOCUMENTS/TRAINING AIDS
- 402 IDENTIFIABLE SUPPORT BASE FOR OPPOSITION FORCE
- 403 SECURITY/LAW ENFORCEMENT UNITS ACTIVELY SUPPORT ONE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP FACTION ABOVE OTHERS
- 404 OPPOSITION FORCE LEADERS REPLACE KEY GOVERNMENT LEADERS
- 405 ACTIONS TO DISCREDIT GOVERNMENT LEADERS
- 406 OPPOSITION FORCE PERSONNEL ENTERING THE COUNTRY
- 407 READY COMMERCIAL ACCESS TO HIGH EXPLOSIVES (E.G., SEMTEX, C-4)
- 408 EVIDENCE OF BOMB/WEAPONS MANUFACTURING CAPABILITY
- 409 USE OF TRANSIENT RESIDENCES
- 410 ABILITY TO MAINTAIN OPERATIONAL MOMENTUM DESPITE LOSS OF KEY LEADER(S)
- 411 KNOWLEDGE OF U.S./WESTERN COMBATANT TACTICS
- 412 TYPE/LEVEL OF PHYSICAL SECURITY USED AT OPPOSITION FORCE BASE-OF-OPERATIONS
- 413 DEFECTION OF MEMBERS OF ONE POLITICAL PARTY/ORGANIZATION TO A MORE RADICAL GROUP
- 414 AVAILABILITY OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION (E.G., MOBILITY FACTORS)
- 415 FOREIGN SOURCES OF REVENUE
- 416 PAYOFFS TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

- 417 GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION
- 418 GOVERNMENT OUTLAWS OPPOSING POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
- 419 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FROM U.S. INTERFERENCE/
NATIONALISM
- 420 EFFORTS TO BRIBE SPONSOR FORCES
- 421 EFFORTS TO BRIBE MISSION FORCE MEMBERS
- 422 PAYMENTS IN EXCHANGE FOR FOREIGN SUPPORT
- 423 OPPOSITION FORCE PROVIDING SERVICES TO CRIMINAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS IN EXCHANGE FOR SOME FORM OF RESOURCE ENHANCEMENT
- 424 NATURALIZED INDIVIDUAL OF PRO-TERRORIST NATIONALITY ORIGIN
USED AS MEMBER OF COUNTERTERRORISM BASE-OF-OPERATIONS
SECURITY FORCE
- 425 USE OF FACILITIES HAVING PHYSICAL CONSTRUCTION ASPECTS WHICH
ENHANCE SECURITY
- 426 CREATION OF A RIVAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
- 427 PRESENCE OF COMMITTEES AND ORGANIZATIONS WHOSE LEADERS DO
NOT SEEM TO BE LOCAL RESIDENTS
- 428 ATTEMPTED RECRUITMENT INTO NEW MOVEMENTS/UNDERGROUND
ORGANIZATIONS/OPPOSITION FORCE GROUPS
- 429 REDUCED AVAILABILITY OF LOCALLY PRODUCED FRESH FOODS
- 430 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FROM U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN
ENVIRONMENTAL/R&D ISSUES (E.G., EXPELLING U.S. SCIENTISTS,
CLOSING RESEARCH SITES)
- 431 IDENTIFICATION MARKINGS/DATES ON MATERIEL/CONTAINERS
- 432 EXECUTIONS OF SPONSOR OFFICIALS
- 433 MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE
OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT
- 434 UNUSUALLY HIGH NUMBER OF SHIPS IN PORT
- 435 UNUSUALLY HIGH NUMBER OF PRO-OPPOSITION COUNTRY SHIPS IN
PORT
- 436 INCREASING LEVELS OF INVOLVEMENT BETWEEN FORMER MILITARY
PERSONNEL AND OPPOSITION FORCE
- 437 COVERT COMMODITY IMPORTS

- 438 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FROM RULING GOVERNMENT BY A POLITICALLY-ORGANIZED FACTION
- 439 SECURITY APPARATUS OPERATES AS A "GOVERNMENT WITHIN A GOVERNMENT"
- 440 ASSOCIATION OF FOREIGN NATIONALS WITH KNOWN OPPOSITION FORCE
- 441 ARREST OF KNOWN OPPOSITION FORCE MEMBERS
- 442 DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW
- 443 EVIDENCE OF UNUSUAL SECURITY MEASURES AT A PRIVATE RESIDENCE
- 444 HIGH LEVEL OF RESIDENTIAL TRANSIENCE
- 445 PURCHASE OF EXPLOSIVES/SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT (E.G., SEMTEX/MERCURY TIMERS)
- 446 PRESENCE OF OPPOSITION FORCE FRONT ORGANIZATIONS
- 447 GOVERNMENT DECLARES FORMAL STATE OF EMERGENCY
- 448 PROGRESSIVE LOSS OF GOVERNMENT COERCIVE POWER
- 449 PRESENCE OF UNUSUAL TYPES/NUMBERS OF RADIO ANTENNAE AT RESIDENCE
- 450 PRESENCE OF OPPOSITION FORCE COMBATANT TRAINING CAMPS
- 451 INCREASED OFFERS TO HELP FROM DOMESTIC HELP AND/OR STORE/OFFICE EMPLOYEES
- 452 ATTEMPTS BY RADICAL PRO-OPPOSITION ELEMENTS TO INFILTRATE SPONSOR ORGANIZATIONS
- 453 EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN/INFLUENTIAL DOMESTIC DONATIONS TO ANTI-SPONSOR/ANTI-U.S. ORGANIZATIONS
- 454 CHANGE/SHIFT IN TRADITIONAL CASH CROPS TO NARCOTIC CROPS
- 455 UNUSUAL SCARCITY OF CLOTHING OR SHOES
- 456 THEFT OF SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES/TYPES OF DRUGS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES
- 457 PERIODIC SCARCITY OF DRUGS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES
- 458 UNUSUAL DISAPPEARANCE OF WILD GAME
- 459 YOUNG MEN BEING TAKEN FROM THEIR HOMES BY OPPOSITION FORCE TO SERVE AS COMBATANTS

- 460 REPRESENTATIVES OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS VOICE DISSATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT POLICIES (E.G., CLERGY OR LABOR LEADERS SPEAKING OUT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT)
- 461 AVAILABILITY OF GOVERNMENT EQUIPMENT ON BLACK MARKET
- 462 POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS, OR ECONOMIC GROUPS CHALLENGE LEGITIMACY OF ELECTION PROCESS
- 463 THEFT/UNUSUAL PURCHASE OF VEHICLE PARTS
- 464 UNUSUAL DAMAGE EVIDENT ON LOCAL VEHICLES
- 465 EVIDENCE/REPORTING OF FORGED/ALTERED MANIFESTS/BILLS OF LADING
- 466 DISCARDED OPERATIONALLY CRITICAL VEHICLE PARTS AND NO CO-LOCATED VEHICLE
- 467 PROGRESSIVE DATES ON CONSUMABLE CONTAINERS/WRAPPERS
- 468 DISCOVERY OF SUPPLY RECORDS
- 469 UNACCOUNTED FOR MILEAGE ON GOVERNMENT VEHICLE ODOMETERS
- 470 MAKESHIFT MARKSMANSHIP TRAINING AREAS
- 471 ACCEPTANCE BY OPPOSITION FORCE OR BY THE GOVERNMENT OF OVERTURES FOR MILITARY OR CIVIL ASSISTANCE FROM MAJOR IDEOLOGICAL OR ECONOMIC COMPETITORS OF THE U.S.
- 472 POORLY MAINTAINED ROADS
- 473 REPLACEMENT OF DOMESTIC HELP AND/OR STORE/OFFICE EMPLOYEES DUE TO SICKNESS, UNEXPECTED TRAVEL, ETC., ON PART OF REGULARS
- 474 CHANGE IN POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS
- 475 INTERCEPT OF FOREIGN NATIONAL OPERATORS ON COMMUNICATIONS NET
- 476 CHANGES IN OPPOSITION FORCE COMBAT READINESS POSTURE
- 477 CHANGE IN OPPOSITION FORCE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
- 478 ROUTING OF MESSAGE TRAFFIC TIED TO SPECIFIC ORGANIZATION
- 479 TENSIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL MILITARY AND POLICE ORGANIZATIONS
- 480 KEY CULTURAL LEADERS/AGENCIES SUPPORT ANTI-SPONSOR/ANTI-MISSION FORCE ACTIVITIES

- 481 TENSIONS RELATED TO ANTI-SPONSOR STANCE BY LOBBY/SPECIAL
INTEREST GROUPS
- 482 PRESENCE OF IDENTIFIABLE OPPOSITION FORCE ORGANIZATION
STRUCTURE
- 483 SIGNS OF INTERNAL REORGANIZATION WITHIN OPPOSITION FORCE
- 484 INCREASED FRICTION BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS
- 485 SPONSOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY CALLING FOR RETURN TO HOSTILITIES
- 486 POPULARITY OF OPPOSITION FORCE LEADERSHIP INCREASES WITHIN
THE ORGANIZATION
- 487 INCREASED GENERAL POPULACE SENSITIVITY TO MOVEMENTS OF
MISSION FORCE
- 488 POLITICAL LEADER WIDELY IDENTIFIED AS A PUPPET OF A FOREIGN
POWER
- 489 GOVERNMENT UNABLE TO COUNTER OR SUPPRESS OPPOSITION FORCES
THROUGH THE LEGAL SYSTEM
- 490 INCREASED SOPHISTICATION OF OPPOSITION FORCE'S PROPAGANDA
EFFORTS
- 491 CAPTURE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE DOCUMENTS FROM OPPOSITION FORCE
- 492 ERADICATION OF EXTRADITION LAWS
- 493 USE OF IDENTIFIABLE TACTICS/STRATEGY CONCENTRATED ON
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
- 494 OPPOSITION FORCE USE OF CONVENTIONAL TACTICS (E.G., SMALL
UNIT OPERATIONS)
- 495 DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS TO OPERATE WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
- 496 OPERATIONAL LINKAGES BETWEEN OPPOSITION GROUPS
- 497 GOVERNMENT FAILS TO ACHIEVE PROGRAM GOALS WITHIN STATED
TIME FRAME
- 498 EMPLOYMENT OF TRADITIONAL SPAN-OF-CONTROL PRACTICES
(E.G., CENTRALIZED VERSUS DECENTRALIZED CONTROL)
- 499 DEMONSTRATED ABILITY TO INTEGRATE SOPHISTICATED OPERATIONAL
DISCIPLINES
- 500 A MAJOR CHANGE IN U.S. RELATIONS WITH A GOVERNMENT THAT IS
THE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM
- 501 A MAJOR CHANGE IN U.S. RELATIONS WITH A GOVERNMENT THAT IS
THE TARGET OF TERRORISM

- 502 SIGNS OF SPONSOR INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL INSTABILITY
- 503 OPPOSITION FORCE LEADERSHIP CENTERS ON CLOSE FAMILY INVOLVEMENT
- 504 ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL MADE ON FUNCTIONAL BASIS BASED ON EACH OPERATION VERSUS PERMANENT TEAM ASSIGNMENT
- 505 ABILITY TO DRAW REQUIRED EXPERTISE FROM OUTSIDE THE ORGANIZATION
- 506 VARYING NUMBER OF OPERATIVES USED IN EACH MISSION TO COMPLICATE MISSION FORCE EFFORTS
- 507 RISE IN OPPOSITION FORCE MEMBERSHIP
- 508 GOVERNMENT AGENCIES UNABLE TO ACCOMMODATE CHANGE
- 509 DECLINE OF OPPOSITION GROUP'S SUPPORT BASE
- 510 DECLINE IN OPPOSITION GROUP'S RECRUITING SUCCESS
- 511 WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN NATIONALS OPERATING WITH OPPOSITION FORCE
- 512 GOVERNMENT USES TACTICS TO CAUSE RIFT BETWEEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT GROUPS
- 513 POLITICAL LEADER INITIATES RELIGIOUS OR ETHNIC REPRESSIVE MEASURES
- 514 USE OF STANDARD UNIFORMS BY OPPOSITION FORCES
- 515 OFFERS TO PURCHASE SPONSOR/MISSION FORCE TRAINING MANUALS/DOCUMENTS
- 516 A POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE TERRORIST GROUP OR A NATION OR POLITICAL MOVEMENT THAT USES TERRORISM
- 517 THREATS OR ACTIONS TO DISRUPT ESTABLISHED TRADING ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE U.S. AND/OR OTHER COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TOWARDS/ALIGNED WITH U.S.
- 518 THREATS OR ACTIONS TO NATIONALIZE PROPERTY OWNED BY U.S. CORPORATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS
- 519 THREATS OR ACTIONS TO HARASS U.S. COMMERCIAL SHIPPING IN OR NEAR TERRITORIAL WATERS
- 520 REFUSAL BY ONE OR MORE GROUPS TO PAY TAXES/USE GOVERNMENT SERVICES
- 521 OPPOSITION FORCE'S LOSS OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL SUPPORT

- 522 EFFORTS TO INVOLVE MISSION FORCE MEMBERS IN BLACK MARKET ACTIVITIES
- 523 FORMER LEADER RETURNS FROM EXILE
- 524 POSSESSION OF OPPOSITION FORCE PRODUCED SCRIPT BY LOCAL POPULACE
- 525 ATTEMPTS OF INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL TO BUY/BARTER FOR MISSION FORCE SUPPLIES/EQUIPMENT
- 526 THE FAILURE OF HIGHLY PUBLICIZED NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AT DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT UNDERLYING THE USE OF TERRORISM
- 527 SHARP DIVISIONS DEVELOP AMONG GOVERNING COALITION
- 528 IMPOSITION OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
- 529 ECONOMICALLY SIGNIFICANT REGION SEEKS TO SECEDE
- 530 REFUSAL OF LOCAL MERCHANTS TO DEAL WITH MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL
- 531 DIMINISHED FOREIGN INVESTMENT
- 532 CAPITAL FLIGHT
- 533 SIGNIFICANT RISE IN UNEMPLOYMENT
- 534 SIGNIFICANT RISE IN INFLATION RATE
- 535 DEVALUATION OF CURRENCY
- 536 BRAIN DRAIN (E.G., WIDESPREAD EMIGRATION OF SKILLED PROFESSIONALS)
- 537 REDUCTION IN WORLD MARKET PRICE OF A MAJOR REVENUE EXPORT COMMODITY
- 538 INCREASED CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS AT BANKS AND OTHER EXCHANGE/FINANCIAL FACILITIES
- 539 UNUSUAL PATTERNS OF CORPORATE MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS (E.G., BUY OUTS)
- 540 FREEZING OF PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPITAL ACCOUNTS
- 541 DETECTION OF LARGE AND RECURRING FUND TRANSFERS TO OUT-OF-COUNTRY, OFFSHORE BANKS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH A QUESTIONABLE REPUTATION

- 542 SPONSOR ADOPTION/USE OF ADVERSARIAL POSITION AGAINST THE U.S. IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY (E.G., VOTING AGAINST THE U.S. ON A SPECIFIC UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION)
- 543 HOSTILE SPONSOR REACTION TO U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTION, IN PUBLIC ARENA (E.G, PUBLICATION OF GOVERNMENT'S DISGUST WITH U.S. INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS)
- 544 INCREASED SPONSOR SENSITIVITY TO MOVEMENTS OF MISSION FORCES (E.G., DECREE RESTRICTING U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL TO THEIR BASE; DECREE RESTRICTING MOBILITY OF U.S. PRESS)
- 545 CHANGE IN SPONSOR POLITICAL STRUCTURE OR KEY PERSONNEL
- 546 SPONSOR OFFICIALS SEEK POLITICAL ASYLUM IN FOREIGN COUNTRY
- 547 FAMILIES OF SPONSOR OFFICIALS LEAVE THE COUNTRY

MASTER MATRIX

SYMBOLGY



THE INDICATOR WOULD APPLY FOR THAT APPROPRIATE GIC.



BLACK: THE INDICATOR PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE FOUND OR APPLY TO THAT PARTICULAR TYPE LIC OPERATION.



BLANK: THE INDICATOR MAY/MAY NOT BE FOUND OR APPLY/NOT APPLY TO THAT PARTICULAR TYPE LIC OPERATION. THE BLANKS ARE SITUATION DEPENDENT.



MARKER: THE INDICATOR PROBABLY WILL BE FOUND AND/OR APPLY TO THAT PARTICULAR TYPE LIC OPERATION.

NOTE: THE FOLLOWING MATRIX PAGES (INDICATORS 01-547) ARE NOT NUMBERED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE.

GICS

		01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
GICS	INFORMATION	X																								
	RESOURCES																								X	
	POPULATION																			X	X	X	X		X	
	ORGANIZATION																									
	OPERATIONS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	ECONOMIC																								X	
	POLITICAL				X		X	X	X		X			X									X			
I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC																										
	a. DISASTER RELIEF	●	●	●	●	●	●											●						●	●	
	b. SHOWS OF FORCE	●	●	●	●													●								
	c. NEO	●	●	●	●													●				●	●		●	●
	d. RECOVERY		●	●	●																					
	e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS	●	●	●																						
	f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING	●	●	●																						
	g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●				●	●	●	●	●
	h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES	●	●	●	●					●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●				●	●	●	●	●
	i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG	●	●	●	●					●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●				●	●	●	●	●
	j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES	●	●	●	●					●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●				●	●	●	●	●
II. ANTITERRORISM																										
	a. INTELLIGENCE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	b. SECURITY	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
III. COUNTERTERRORISM																										
	a. INTELLIGENCE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	b. SECURITY	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS	●	●	●	●														●							
	d. HOSTAGE RESCUE	●	●	●	●														●							
	e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS	●	●	●	●														●							
IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY																										
	a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE	●	●	●	●													●			●			●		
	b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT	●	●	●	●													●			●			●		

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INSTABILITY INDICATOR THREAT MATRIX

		26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
GICS	INFORMATION																				X	X				X
	RESOURCES		X		X	X	X					X	X				X				X				X	X
	POPULATION	X		X	X	X	X	X		X					X		X	X	X	X	X					
	ORGANIZATION																									
	OPERATIONS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	ECONOMIC																									
LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS	POLITICAL							X								X										
	I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC																									
	a. DISASTER RELIEF																									
	b. SHOWS OF FORCE																									
	c. NSO																									
	d. RECOVERY																									
	e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS																									
	f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PRTCT OF SHIPPING																									
	g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER																									
	h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES																									
	i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG																									
	j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES																									
	II. ANTITERRORISM																									
	a. INTELLIGENCE																									
	b. SECURITY																									
	III. COUNTERTERRORISM																									
	a. INTELLIGENCE																									
	b. SECURITY																									
	c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS																									
	d. HOSTAGE RESCUE																									
	e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS																									
	IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY																									
	a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																									
	b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																									
	c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																									
	d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																									
	V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY																									
	a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																									
	b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																									
	c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																									
	d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS																									
	e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																									
	f. US TACTICAL OPS																									
	VI. PEACEKEEPING																									
	a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES																									
	b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES																									
	c. SUPERVISN OF WITHDRAWALS/DISENGAGEMENTS																									
	d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES																									
	e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOB																									
	f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER																									
		26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INSTABILITY INDICATOR THREAT MATRIX

GICS

	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75
INFORMATION	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
RESOURCES	X					X		X		X		X				X	X	X	X	X	X				X
POPULATION	X																								
ORGANIZATION										X													X		
OPERATIONS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
ECONOMIC																									
POLITICAL																									

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
b. SHOWS OF FORCE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
c. NSO	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
d. RECOVERY	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
b. SECURITY	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
b. SECURITY	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
d. HOSTAGE RESCUE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
f. US TACTICAL OPS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
c. SUPERVSN OF WITHDRAWALS/DISENGAGEMENT	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

LC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INSTABILITY INDICATOR THREAT MATRIX

GICS

	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
INFORMATION	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X													
RESOURCES		X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X
POPULATION																									
ORGANIZATION		X																							
OPERATIONS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
ECONOMIC															X				X						
POLITICAL																X	X	X							

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC																									
a. DISASTER RELIEF																									
b. SHOWS OF FORCE																									
c. NSO																									
d. RECOVERY																									
e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS																									
f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PRTCT OF SHIPPING																									
g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER																									
h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES																									
i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG																									
j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES																									
II. ANTITERRORISM																									
a. INTELLIGENCE																									
b. SECURITY																									
III. COUNTERTERRORISM																									
a. INTELLIGENCE																									
b. SECURITY																									
c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS																									
d. HOSTAGE RESCUE																									
e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS																									
IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY																									
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																									
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																									
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																									
d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																									
V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY																									
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																									
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																									
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																									
d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS																									
e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																									
f. US TACTICAL OPS																									
VI. PEACEKEEPING																									
a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES																									
b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES																									
c. SUPRVSN OF WITHDRAWALS/DISENGAGMENTS																									
d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES																									
e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS																									
f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER																									

LC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INSTABILITY INDICATOR THREAT MATRIX

		101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125
GICS	INFORMATION																									
	RESOURCES	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X							X	X	X	X	X	X		X	
	POPULATION																X									X
	ORGANIZATION																									
	OPERATIONS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	ECONOMIC																									
	POLITICAL											X														
I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC																										
	a. DISASTER RELIEF	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●					●	●		
	b. SHOWS OF FORCE	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●					●	●		
	c. NEO	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●					●	●		
	d. RECOVERY	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●								
	e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●								
	f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING			●	●					●	●		●				●	●								
	g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●					●	●		
	h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●					●	●		
	i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●								
	j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●								
II. ANTITERRORISM																										
	a. INTELLIGENCE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	b. SECURITY	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
III. COUNTERTERRORISM																										
	a. INTELLIGENCE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	b. SECURITY	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS	●		●	●					●	●		●		●	●	●	●								
	d. HOSTAGE RESCUE	●		●	●					●	●		●		●	●	●	●								
	e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS	●		●	●					●	●		●		●	●	●	●								
IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY																										
	a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY																										
	a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	f. US TACTICAL OPS	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
VI. PEACEKEEPING																										
	a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●								●
	b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●								●
	c. SUPERVISN OF WTHDRWLS/DISENGAGMNTS	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●								●
	d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES			●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●								●
	e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS	●											●	●	●	●	●	●								●
	f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●								●

GLCS

[illegible]

GICS

		151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176		
GICS	INFORMATION						X									X						X	X			X			
	RESOURCES	X	X	X	X	X	X																						
	POPULATION																						X		X				
	ORGANIZATION						X	X																					
	OPERATIONS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
	ECONOMIC																												
	POLITICAL																								X				
I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC																													
	a. DISASTER RELIEF	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
	b. SHOWS OF FORCE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
	c. NEO	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
	d. RECOVERY	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
	e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
	f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PRTCT OF SHIPPING	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
	g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
	h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
	i. DOG SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
	j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
II. ANTITERRORISM																													
	a. INTELLIGENCE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
	b. SECURITY	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
III. COUNTERTERRORISM																													
	a. INTELLIGENCE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
	b. SECURITY	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
	c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
	d. HOSTAGE RESCUE	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			
	e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS	●	●	●	●																								

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INSTABILITY INDICATOR THREAT MATRIX

GICS

	201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225
INFORMATION										X															
RESOURCES	X		X	X	X			X	X	X	X														
POPULATION															X	X		X						X	
ORGANIZATION																									
OPERATIONS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
ECONOMIC												X													
POLITICAL													X						X						

LC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC																									
a. DISASTER RELIEF																									
b. SHOWS OF FORCE																									
c. NSO																									
d. RECOVERY																									
e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS																									
f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING																									
g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER																									
h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES																									
i. DOO SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG																									
j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES																									
II. ANTITERRORISM																									
a. INTELLIGENCE																									
b. SECURITY																									
III. COUNTERTERRORISM																									
a. INTELLIGENCE																									
b. SECURITY																									
c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS																									
d. HOSTAGE RESCUE																									
e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS																									
IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY																									
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																									
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																									
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																									
d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																									
V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY																									
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																									
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																									
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																									
d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS																									
e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																									
f. US TACTICAL OPS																									
VI. PEACEKEEPING																									
a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES																									
b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES																									
c. SUPERVSN OF WITHDRAWALS/DISENGAGEMENTS																									
d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES																									
e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS																									
f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER																									

201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INSTABILITY INDICATOR THREAT MATRIX

		226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250	
GICS	INFORMATION																									X	
	RESOURCES				X				XX							X											
	POPULATION																					X					
	ORGANIZATION				X																						
	OPERATIONS		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
	ECONOMIC																										
	POLITICAL	X	X			X	X						X						X	X	X			X			
I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC																											
	a. DISASTER RELIEF	●	●	●		●																●	●				
	b. SHOWS OF FORCE	●	●	●		●																					
	c. NEO				●		●																				
	d. RECOVERY				●		●																				
	e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS				●		●																				
	f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING				●		●																				
	g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER	●	●	●	●		●															●	●				
	h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES	●	●	●	●		●																				
	i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG		●	●	●		●																●				
	j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES		●	●	●		●																				
II. ANTITERRORISM																											
	a. INTELLIGENCE		●	●	●	●	●													●	●	●	●			●	●
	b. SECURITY		●	●	●	●	●													●	●	●	●			●	●
III. COUNTERTERRORISM																											
	a. INTELLIGENCE		●	●		●														●	●	●	●			●	●
	b. SECURITY		●	●		●														●	●	●	●			●	●
	c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS				●		●													●	●						
	d. HOSTAGE RESCUE				●		●													●	●						
	e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS				●		●													●	●						
IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY																											
	a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE		●	●		●														●	●	●	●			●	●
	b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT		●	●		●														●	●	●	●			●	●
	c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT		●	●		●														●	●	●	●			●	●
	d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT		●	●		●														●	●	●	●			●	●
V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY																											
	a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE		●	●		●														●	●	●	●			●	●
	b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT	●		●	●		●													●	●	●	●			●	●
	c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT		●	●		●														●	●	●	●			●	●
	d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS		●	●		●														●	●	●	●			●	●
	e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT		●	●		●														●	●	●	●			●	●
	f. US TACTICAL OPS		●	●		●														●	●	●	●			●	●
VI. PEACEKEEPING																											
	a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES		●	●	●	●	●					●	●	●	●			●	●								
	b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES		●	●	●	●	●					●	●	●	●			●	●								
	c. SUPERVSN OF WITHDRAWALS/DISENGAGEMENTS		●	●	●	●	●					●	●	●	●			●	●								
	d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES					●	●					●	●	●	●			●	●								
	e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS		●	●	●	●	●					●	●	●	●			●	●								
	f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER		●	●	●	●	●					●	●	●	●			●	●								

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INSTABILITY INDICATOR THREAT MATRIX

		251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275
GICS	INFORMATION					X	X																			X
	RESOURCES			X																						
	POPULATION																					X				
	ORGANIZATION																									
	OPERATIONS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	ECONOMIC																									
	POLITICAL							X		X	X															
I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC																										
a. DISASTER RELIEF																										
b. SHOWS OF FORCE																										
c. NSD																										
d. RECOVERY																										
e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS																										
f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING																										
g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER																										
h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE BURGESS																										
i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG																										
j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES																										
II. ANTITERRORISM																										
a. INTELLIGENCE																										
b. SECURITY																										
III. COUNTERTERRORISM																										
a. INTELLIGENCE																										
b. SECURITY																										
c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS																										
d. HOSTAGE RESCUE																										
e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS																										
IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY																										
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																										
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																										
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																										
d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																										
V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY																										
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																										
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																										
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																										
d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS																										
e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																										
f. US TACTICAL OPS																										
VI. PEACEKEEPING																										
a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES																										
b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES																										
c. SUPERVSN OF WTHDRWLS/DISENGAGMNTS																										
d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES																										
e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS																										
f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER																										

251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275

LUC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

[illegible]

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INSTABILITY INDICATOR THREAT MATRIX

GICS

	301	302	303	304	305	306	307	308	309	310	311	312	313	314	315	316	317	318	319	320	321	322	323	324	325
INFORMATION																									
RESOURCES				X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X					X	X		X
POPULATION									X																
ORGANIZATION																			X			X			
OPERATIONS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X				X	X	X	X	X
ECONOMIC						X																			
POLITICAL																X	X		X	X					

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC																									
a. DISASTER RELIEF																									
b. SHOWS OF FORCE																									
c. NSO																									
d. RECOVERY																									
e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS																									
f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING																									
g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER																									
h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES																									
i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG																									
j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES																									
II. ANTITERRORISM																									
a. INTELLIGENCE																									
b. SECURITY																									
III. COUNTERTERRORISM																									
a. INTELLIGENCE																									
b. SECURITY																									
c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS																									
d. HOSTAGE RESCUE																									
e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS																									
IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY																									
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																									
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																									
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																									
d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																									
V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY																									
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																									
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																									
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																									
d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS																									
e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																									
f. US TACTICAL OPS																									
VI. PEACEKEEPING																									
a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES																									
b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES																									
c. SUPERVISN OF WTHDRWLS/DISENGAGMNTS																									
d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES																									
e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS																									
f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER																									

301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325

GICS

		326	327	328	329	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	340	341	342	343	344	345	346	347	348	349	350			
GICS	INFORMATION																												
	RESOURCES			X								XX				XX													
	POPULATION	X																											
	ORGANIZATION	X			X																								
	OPERATIONS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
	ECONOMIC	X																			X								
	POLITICAL							XX						X								X		X					
I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC																													
	a. DISASTER RELIEF																												
	b. SHOWS OF FORCE																												
	c. NEO																												
	d. RECOVERY																												
	e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS																												
	f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING																												
	g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER																												
	h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES																												
	i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG																												
	j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES																												
II. ANTITERRORISM																													
	a. INTELLIGENCE																												
	b. SECURITY																												
III. COUNTERTERRORISM																													
	a. INTELLIGENCE																												
	b. SECURITY																												
	c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS																												
	d. HOSTAGE RESCUE																												
	e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS																												
IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY																													
	a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																												
	b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																												
	c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																												
	d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																												
V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY																													
	a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																												
	b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																												
	c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																												
	d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS																												
	e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																												
	f. US TACTICAL OPS																												
VI. PEACEKEEPING																													
	a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES																												
	b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES																												
	c. SUPRVSN OF WTHDRWALS/DISENGAGMNTS																												
	d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES																												
	e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS																												
	f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER																												
		326	327	328	329	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	340	341	342	343	344	345	346	347	348	349	350			

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INSTABILITY INDICATOR THREAT MATRIX

GICS

	361	362	363	364	365	366	367	368	369	370	371	372	373	374	375
INFORMATION				X	X										
RESOURCES			X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
POPULATION										X					
ORGANIZATION				X											
OPERATIONS		X							X						
ECONOMIC		X		X	X		X								
POLITICAL		X	X		X	X	X	X		X			X		X

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC															
a. DISASTER RELIEF	●	●		●		●	●			●	●		●		●
b. SHOWS OF FORCE	●	●				●	●			●		●	●	●	●
c. NEO	●	●				●	●			●		●	●	●	●
d. RECOVERY	●					●									
e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS	●					●				●		●		●	
f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING	●	●				●	●			●		●		●	
g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER	●			●		●	●			●	●	●	●	●	●
h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES	●					●				●		●	●	●	●
i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG	●					●				●		●	●	●	●
j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES	●					●				●		●	●	●	●
II. ANTITERRORISM															
a. INTELLIGENCE	●	●				●	●			●	●		●	●	●
b. SECURITY	●	●				●	●			●	●		●	●	●
III. COUNTERTERRORISM															
a. INTELLIGENCE	●	●				●	●			●	●		●	●	●
b. SECURITY	●	●				●	●			●	●		●	●	●
c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS	●					●	●			●	●		●	●	●
d. HOSTAGE RESCUE	●					●	●			●	●		●	●	●
e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS	●					●	●			●	●		●	●	●
IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY															
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE	●					●				●	●	●		●	●
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT	●					●				●	●	●	●	●	●
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT	●					●				●	●	●	●	●	●
d. C3 SYSTEMS SUPPORT	●					●				●	●	●	●	●	●
V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY															
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE	●					●				●	●	●		●	●
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT	●					●				●	●	●	●	●	●
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT	●					●				●	●	●	●	●	●
d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS	●					●				●	●	●	●	●	●
e. C3 SYSTEMS SUPPORT	●					●				●	●	●	●	●	●
f. US TACTICAL OPS	●					●				●	●	●	●	●	●
VI. PEACEKEEPING															
a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES	●					●				●	●	●		●	●
b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES	●					●				●	●	●	●	●	●
c. SUPERVISN OF WTHDRWLS/DISENGAGMNTS	●					●				●	●	●	●	●	●
d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES	●					●				●	●	●	●	●	●
e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS	●					●				●	●	●	●	●	●
f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER	●					●				●	●	●	●	●	●

361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INSTABILITY INDICATOR THREAT MATRIX

		376	377	378	379	380	381	382	383	384	385	386	387	388	389	390	391	392	393	394	395	396	397	398	399	400			
GICS	INFORMATION																									X			
	RESOURCES	X	X	X		X		X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X						X	X	X			
	POPULATION									X		X		X	X														
	ORGANIZATION													X	X	X		X											
	OPERATIONS									X	X								X	X		X	X	X		X			
	ECONOMIC		X																	X	X		X	X	X				
	POLITICAL	X		X	X		X	X	X		X		X			X				X	X		X		X	X	X		
I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC																													
a. DISASTER RELIEF																													
b. SHOWS OF FORCE																													
c. NSO																													
d. RECOVERY																													
e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS																													
f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING																													
g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER																													
h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE BURGERS																													
i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG																													
j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES																													
II. ANTITERRORISM																													
a. INTELLIGENCE																													
b. SECURITY																													
III. COUNTERTERRORISM																													
a. INTELLIGENCE																													
b. SECURITY																													
c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS																													
d. HOSTAGE RESCUE																													
e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS																													
IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY																													
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																													
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																													
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																													
d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																													
V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY																													
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																													
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																													
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																													
d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS																													
e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																													
f. US TACTICAL OPS																													
VI. PEACEKEEPING																													
a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES																													
b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES																													
c. SUPERVISN OF WITHDRAWALS/DISENGAGMNTS																													
d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES																													
e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS																													
f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER																													

376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400

[illegible]

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INSTABILITY INDICATOR THREAT MATRIX

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NSO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PRTCT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPERVSN OF WTHDRWLS/DISENGAGMNTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INSTABILITY INDICATOR THREAT MATRIX

GICS

	461	462	463	464	465	466	467	468	469	470	471	472	473	474	475
INFORMATION															X
RESOURCES	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
POPULATION							X	X		X					
ORGANIZATION															
OPERATIONS					X					X	X	X	X		
ECONOMIC				X											
POLITICAL								X	X					X	X

LC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LC															
a. DISASTER RELIEF															
b. SHOWS OF FORCE															
c. NSO															
d. RECOVERY															
e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS															
f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING															
g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER															
h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES															
i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG															
j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES															
II. ANTITERRORISM															
a. INTELLIGENCE															
b. SECURITY															
III. COUNTERTERRORISM															
a. INTELLIGENCE															
b. SECURITY															
c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS															
d. HOSTAGE RESCUE															
e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS															
IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY															
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE															
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT															
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT															
d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT															
V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY															
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE															
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT															
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT															
d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS															
e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT															
f. US TACTICAL OPS															
VI. PEACEKEEPING															
a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES															
b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES															
c. SUPRVSN OF WTHDRWALS/DISENGAGMNTS															
d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES															
e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS															
f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER															

461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475

GICS

[illegible]

GLCS

		801	802	803	804	805	806	807	808	809	810	811	812	813	814	815	816	817	818	819	820	821	822	823	824	825
GICS	INFORMATION																									
	RESOURCES																									
	POPULATION																									
	ORGANIZATION																									
	OPERATIONS																									
	ECONOMIC																									
	POLITICAL																									
I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC																										
a. DISASTER RELIEF																										
b. SHOWS OF FORCE																										
c. NSO																										
d. RECOVERY																										
e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS																										
f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING																										
g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER																										
h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES																										
i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG																										
j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES																										
II. ANTITERRORISM																										
a. INTELLIGENCE																										
b. SECURITY																										
III. COUNTERTERRORISM																										
a. INTELLIGENCE																										
b. SECURITY																										
c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS																										
d. HOSTAGE RESCUE																										
e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS																										
IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY																										
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																										
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																										
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																										
d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																										
V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY																										
a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE																										
b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT																										
c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT																										
d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS																										
e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT																										
f. US TACTICAL OPS																										
VI. PEACEKEEPING																										
a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES																										
b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES																										
c. SUPRVSN OF WITHDRWLS/DISENGAGMNTS																										
d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES																										
e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS																										
f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER																										

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INSTABILITY INDICATOR THREAT MATRIX

826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

XX X X XX XXX XXXX XX XXX

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

- a. DISASTER RELIEF
- b. SHOWS OF FORCE
- c. NSO
- d. RECOVERY
- e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS
- f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING
- g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER
- h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES
- i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG
- j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

- a. INTELLIGENCE
- b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

- a. INTELLIGENCE
- b. SECURITY
- c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS
- d. HOSTAGE RESCUE
- e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

- a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE
- b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
- c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT
- d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

- a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE
- b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
- c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT
- d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS
- e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

VI. PEACEKEEPING

- a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES
- b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES
- c. SUPERVISN OF WITHDRAWALS/DISENGAGEMENTS
- d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES
- e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS
- f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

Annex A

DEFINITIONS/EXPLANATION OF TERMS

Antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces.

Belligerents. All combatants associated with the peacekeeping mission.

Combatting Terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism and counterterrorism, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

Counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civil actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.

Counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

Generic Instability Category (GIC). A categorical grouping of instability indicators.

- o **Economic.** Financial factors/elements, to include currency, commodities, and trade of friendly/non-friendly organizations/nations to promote or hinder mission objectives.
- o **Information.** Various methods of collecting/disseminating data used to promote opposition force objectives or to hinder mission force objectives.
- o **Operations.** Procedures and methods of performance by opposition force to meet objectives. Examples include area of operations (urban/rural), types of acts/actions (raids/ambushes).
- o **Organization.** The leadership process used by the opposition force to obtain mission objectives. Examples include leadership structure, ideological orientation, structural components, and significant interorganizational linkages.
- o **Political.** Factors or events within a government or opposition force organization/infrastructure that impact on its ability to function.
- o **Population.** All demographic data to include religion, culture, and ethno-specific characteristics.

- o Resources. Those items which provide the ability to conduct/maintain activities designed to hinder mission force operations. These include such elements as logistics, materiel/equipment, manpower, and popular support.

Instability Indicator (I²). A specific issue/factor which may represent a potential threat to mission force operations and protection.

Insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.

Low Intensity Conflict Operational Category (LOC). The six (6) types of military operations conducted in the low intensity conflict (LIC) environment as found in Joint Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Support to Insurgency, Support to Counterinsurgency, Antiterrorism, Counterterrorism, Contingency Operations in LIC, and Peacekeeping).

Mission Force. Forces which are responsible for executing/supporting a LIC operational mission.

Non-sponsoring Belligerents. Those conflicting parties within the operational environment who are not directly supportive of the peacekeeping force presence.

Opposition Force. Organizations/individuals conducting activities against the mission force.

Peacekeeping. Efforts taken with the consent of the civil or military authorities of the belligerent parties in a conflict to maintain a negotiated truce in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve and maintain peace.

Sponsor. The principal governmental/organizational entity responsible for supporting or coordinating the presence of the mission force.

Sponsoring Belligerents. Those conflicting parties who request the presence of a peacekeeping force.

Support to Counterinsurgency. Any assistance provided to a government to defeat an insurgency.

Support to Insurgency. Any assistance provided to an insurgent organization in its efforts to overthrow the existing government.

Terrorism. The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.

Annex B

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
2. Joint Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Test Pub) October 1990.
3. Joint Pub 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (Initial Draft) June 1991.
4. Joint Pub 3-07.2 JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations (Final Draft) November 1991.
5. Joint Pub 3-07.3 JTTP for Antiterrorism (Initial Draft) September 1991.
6. FM 100-2-20, The Threat in Low Intensity Conflict.
7. FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.
8. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.
9. FM 100-5, Operations.
10. FM 31-20, Special Forces Operations.
11. FM 31-21, Special Forces Techniques.
12. Counterinsurgency Questionnaire and Collection Guide, BDM Corporation.
13. Employment of Military Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations in the Third World, BDM Corporation.
14. Financial Aspects of Peacekeeping Operations, Melvin Richmond.
15. Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, CIA.
16. Indicators Templating: A Reference Aid to Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Analysis. A-AF CLIC Report.
17. OAU and Peacekeeping: Pan African Defense Force, James Ojokojo.
18. Peacekeeping and Lebanon: Lessons Learned, Roger Mauer.

19. Politically Organized Insurgency: Their Strategies and Tactics, Farid Aboleathi.
20. Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare, Donald Hanle.
21. Terrorism: Ideology and Revolution, Noel O'Sullivan.
22. The Age of Terrorism, Walter Laquer.
23. The Iranian Rescue Mission, Paul Ryan.
24. The Prevention of Terrorism and Rehabilitation of Terrorists: Some Preliminary Thoughts, B. Hoffman.
25. The Raid, Ben Schemmer.
26. The Role of External Support for an Insurgency Movement, Defense Systems Inc.
27. Urgent Fury, MAJ Mark Adkin.
28. Peacekeeping and the Army: Where are We? COL David J. Lofgren
29. Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, LTC Charles Ayers.

Annex C
BLANK MATRIX

**NOTE: THE FOLLOWING BLANK MATRIX PAGES ARE PROVIDED FOR YOUR USE
AND ARE NOT NUMBERED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE.**

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

1. DISASTER RELIEF

1. SHOWS OF FORCE

6. NRO

4. RECOVERY

2. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

1. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OF SHIPPING

6. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

N. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGED

I. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

1. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

8. INTELLIGENCE

1. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

II. INTELLIGENCE

1. SECURITY

2. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

1. HOSTAGE RESCUE

9. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

g. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

4. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

2. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

4. C2 SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

2. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

B. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

6. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

4. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

6. CASE SYSTEMS SUPPORT

1. UN TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

2. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

B. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

2. SUPPLY OF WITHDRAWALS/DISENGAGEMENTS

4. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

g. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOR

1. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

[illegible]

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NSO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAVY/PRECT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOO SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPERVISN OF WITHDRAWALS/DISENGAGEMENTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NSO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPERVISN OF WITHDRAWALS/DISENGAGEMENTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NSO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PRECT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPRVSN OF WTHDRWLS/DISENGAGMNTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NEO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOO SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPERVSN OF WITHDRWLS/DISENGAGMNTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NSO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PRTCT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPERVSN OF WTHDRWLS/DISENGAGMNTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NEO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOO SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPERVSN OF WITHDRAWALS/DISENGAGEMENTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NEO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PRTCT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPERVISN OF WTHDRWALS/DISENGAGMNTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225

GICS

**INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL**

226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250

LC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NEO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAVY/PRETEXT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPERVSN OF WTHDRWLS/DISENGAGMNTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250

GICS

**INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL**

261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NSO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAVY/PRTCT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPERVSN OF WITHDRAWALS/DISENGAGEMENTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DENOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

**INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL**

A. DISASTER RELIEF

B. SHOWS OF FORCE

8. NRO

4. RECOVERY

9. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

1. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

IV. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

1. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

I. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

N. ANTITERRORISM

g. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

ML COUNTERTERRORISM

2. INTELLIGENCE

D. SECURITY

8. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

4. HOSTAGE RESCUE

9. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

2. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

LOGISTICS SUPPORT

4. FBI SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

4. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

LOGISTICS SUPPORT

1. CIVIL-MILITARY 929

● CRYSTAL SYSTEMS SUPPORT

1. MILITARY OPERATIONS

W. PEACEKEEPING

• SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

B. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

4. SUPERVISOR OF WITHDRAWAL/DISENGAGEMENT

4. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

• SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOM

2. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NEO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PTECT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOO SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPRVSN OF WTHDRWALS/DISENGAGMNTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DENOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325

301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NEO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PRTCT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPERVN OF WTHDRWLS/DISENGAGMNTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350

326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350

[illegible]

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NSO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PRETEXT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPERVISN OF WITHDRAWALS/DISENGAGEMENTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400

376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NEO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAVY/PRTCT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOD SUPPORT TO CC/INTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPERVSN OF WTHDRWLS/DISENGAGMNTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

[illegible]

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NEO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPERVN OF WTHDRWLS/DISENGAGMNTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475

GICS

**INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL**

476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

- a. DISASTER RELIEF
- b. SHOWS OF FORCE
- c. NEO
- d. RECOVERY
- e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS
- f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PRTCT OF SHIPPING
- g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER
- h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES
- i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG
- j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

- a. INTELLIGENCE
- b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

- a. INTELLIGENCE
- b. SECURITY
- c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS
- d. HOSTAGE RESCUE
- e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

- a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE
- b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
- c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT
- d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

- a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE
- b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
- c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT
- d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS
- e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT
- f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

- a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES
- b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES
- c. SUPRVSN OF WTHDRWLS/DISENGAGMNTS
- d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES
- e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS
- f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500

GICS

**INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL**

LC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

- a. DISASTER RELIEF
- b. SHOWS OF FORCE
- c. NEO
- d. RECOVERY
- e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS
- f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PRECT OF SHIPPING
- g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER
- h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES
- i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG
- j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

- a. INTELLIGENCE
- b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

- a. INTELLIGENCE
- b. SECURITY
- c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS
- d. HOSTAGE RESCUE
- e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

- a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE
- b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
- c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT
- d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

- a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE
- b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
- c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT
- d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS
- e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT
- f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

- a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES
- b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES
- c. SUPRVSN OF WTHDRWALS/DISENGAGEMENTS
- d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES
- e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS
- f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825

801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825

GICS

INFORMATION
RESOURCES
POPULATION
ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC
POLITICAL

826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850

LIC OPERATING CATEGORIES AND TYPE OPERATIONS

I. CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIC

a. DISASTER RELIEF

b. SHOWS OF FORCE

c. NEO

d. RECOVERY

e. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

f. FREEDOM OF NAV/PROTECT OF SHIPPING

g. OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER

h. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGES

i. DOD SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG

j. SUPPORT TO U.S. CIVIL AUTHORITIES

II. ANTITERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

III. COUNTERTERRORISM

a. INTELLIGENCE

b. SECURITY

c. HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

d. HOSTAGE RESCUE

e. ASSAULT OPERATIONS

IV. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

V. SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

a. ADVISORY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

b. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

c. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

d. CIVIL-MILITARY OPS

e. CS SYSTEMS SUPPORT

f. US TACTICAL OPS

VI. PEACEKEEPING

a. SUPERVISION OF FREE TERRITORIES

b. SUPERVISION OF CEASE-FIRES

c. SUPERVISN OF WITHDRAWALS/DISENGAGEMENTS

d. SUPERVISION OF POW EXCHANGES

e. SUPERVISION OF DEMIL/DEMOS

f. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850